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The phenomenom of airport congestion at New Zealand's major airports is the subject of 
this research thesis. A growing problem in New Zealand, the importance of understanding 
this problem and identifying options for solution is high. The intention of this research was 
to identify the extent of congestion at New Zealand airports; to estimate the industry cost of 
congestion; to identify the causes of congestion; to estimate future levels of congestion; and 
to offer suggestions for solution of this problem. 
Actual levels of airborne delay for flights arriving at these airports have been measured, and 
the industry cost of this delay in terms of time and fuel burn is estimated. Airport capacity for 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch airports is established and compared with the levels 
of demand for service. The level of delay attributable to excess demand is thus established. 
Comparison of differing airports' capacity levels indicates some level of delay attributable to 
air traffic control procedures. The majority of current delay is directly attributable to demand 
schedules which are characterised by grouping of demand - i.e. the scheduling of several 
aircraft at the same time, followed by periods of little or no demand. At Auckland and 
Christchurch airports, the current levels of airborne delay is due exclusively to scheduling 
patterns. Demand exceeds available capacity for many short periods throughout the course 
of the day, but is intersperced by a greater number of periods where capacity exceeds 
current demand. The delays experienced at these airports is also low - averaging 
approximately three minutes per aircraft. 
Similar levels of delay are experienced at Wellington airport during weather conditions which 
meet visual or instrument above circling minima criteria, but delays rise markedly when 
weather conditions fall below this criteria. This is due to the differing air traffic control 
procedures which must (for safety reasons) be invoked during these conditions, and result in 
a decrease in airport capacity. Instrument conditions below circling minima occur 
approximately 11 % of the time at Wellington, compared with approximately 3% for Auckland 
and Christchurch. Moreover, weather conditions below circling minima do not necessarily 
reduce the capacity of Auckland or Christchurch airports. 
Forecast increases in demand over the next twelve years, when compared with available 
airport capacity indicate future levels of delay at extremely high rates for Auckland and 
Wellington airports which are currently operating at levels close to capacity. At Auckland, 
management of aircraft schedules is sufficient to provide a solution until 2005. Forecast 
levels of demand b~ond this indicate that a greater level of solution will be required. These 
issues are likely to be addressed by the addition of a second runway. 
At Wellington airport the problem of congestion is more severe. Capacity is well exceeded 
by present levels of demand during weather conditions below circling mtnima, and is 
reached during instrument conditions for significant periods. There is little available capacity 
for future growth. Terrain and cost issues make additional runways for Wellington airport 
unfeasible options. It is essential then, that the available capacity of Wellington airport be 
managed with regard to available capacity. This must take the form of schedule 
management, and restrictions on aircraft types during busy periods. 
The primary cause of capacity degradation during weather conditions below circling minima 
is increased separation provided by air traffic control to keep aircraft safely separated in the 
event of a missed approach. Where the performance characteristics of the aircraft using an 
airport are similar, and minimal wake turbulence separation applies, then it is not necessary 
to increase separation between aircraft to provide this protection. In other words, if all 
aircraft using Wellington airport are restricted to a similar size and have similar speed and 
climb performance, then capacity will not be degraded during weather conditions below 
circling minima. As well as providing a constant capacity, standardisation of aircraft types 
will provide a small increase in that capacity. 
This is the only feasible solution to a growing problem at Wellington airport. It should be 
implemented immediately to both relieve current congestion and to prevent future levels of 
delay which are forecast to reach 1 hour duration by 2000 and exceed 6 hours by 2005. 
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Airport and airspace congestion is the direct result of too many aircraft trying to use 
airport resources - primarily the runway - than can be accommodated. In other 
words, congestion occurs when demand exceeds available capacity - the level of 
congestion being directly proportional to the level of excess demand. A new 
phenomena to the New Zealand industry in 1991 , congestion has since risen to a 
level where the economic considerations of high levels of delay dictate the 
attendance to, and resolution of this problem. 
Accordingly, the focus of this research is an investigation of the levels of delay at 
New Zealand's major airports and the level of resolution which is required to solve 
the problem. 
Specifically, the objectives of this research are: 
1. To define the levels of delay currently experienced at New Zealand airports 
2. To indicate the effects of this delay in terms of disruption and fuel costs 
3. To describe the level of demand for service experienced at New Zealand airports 
4. To identify the current capacity of New Zealand's major airports 
5. To identify and describe the causes of delay 
6. To estimate future levels of delay 
7. To devise possible options for solution 
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Airport Congestion - a New Zealand Problem: 
A review 
The study of airport congestion - historically a world wide problem and, increasingly a 
New Zealand problem - is examined. Whilst congestion of airports and airspace has long 
been an issue in the U.S. and in parts of Europe, smaller countries such as New Zealand 
have largely remained immune to such inconveniences to airline scheduling. In 1991, the 
New Zealand industry first faced the realities of delays at Wellington airport - due to excess 
demand and fluctuating capacity levels with weather conditions. In the years since, delays 
have grown more frequent, lengthier and have spread to encompass Auckland and even 
Christchurch airports. As well as schedule disruptions, the economic effects of these delays 
have been sufficient to engender a response from the industry in the form of increasing 
complaints levelled at Airways Corporation, the air traffic control service provider and at 
the Wellington Airport Company, the owner of Wellington airport. The New Zealand 
industry is fast approaching a time where increasing regulation and management of air 
traffic levels is becoming a reality. 
Airport congestion is often related to the after-effects of industry de-regulation where 
competition encourages the close attention of airlines to consumer demand issues. 
Unfortunately this often results in too many small aircraft congesting airport systems. 
This is a problem which has affected many air transport industries, and is one of the 
primary causes of airport congestion within New Zealand. 
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Congestion: 
Airport and airspace congestion is the result of too many aircraft trying to use airport 
resources - primarily the runway - than can be accommodated. In other words, 
congestion occurs when demand exceeds available capacity; the level of congestion 
being directly proportional to the level of excess demand. An increasingly world wide 
phenomenon, airport congestion has primarily been the problem of the U.S. and 
European industries. 
Deregulatory Effects: 
In the U.S. particularly, the years following deregulation were characterised by 
smaller aircraft being operated on a more frequent basis. A direct response to 
competition and consumer demand, this trend caused significant increases in 
congestion levels (O'lone, 1988). By 1988, the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) was using its administrative powers to limit flight numbers into busy airports, 
largely in response to requests by airlines feeling the economic effects of soaring 
levels of delay (Fotos, 1988). A duplication of this trend has been seen in the New 
Zealand industry, with smaller and more frequent flights accelerating a growing 
capacity problem at both Auckland and Wellington airports (Macleod & Webb, 1997). 
u.s. solutions: 
Other attempts by the U.S. administration to overcome the capacity problem 
experienced by their industry have included pricing structures designed to favour the 
use of larger aircraft. O'lone (1988) describes the introduction of PACE - Program 
for Airport Capacity Efficiency - at Boston's logan airport. Imposing sUbstantial fee 
penalties for smaller aircraft types, this program was successful in its 
discouragement of general aviation aircraft at the airport, and in prompting moves 
towards larger aircraft by some commuter airlines. The program failed, however, 
when airlines passed fee increases to the consumer rather than implementing the 
desired shift toward larger aircraft types. 
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The U.S. industry has continued to address its congestion problems through pricing I 
incentive structures. Fotos (1989) describes a peak-pricing program designed to 
reduce inconvenience to large aircraft while offering subsidies to commuter airlines in 
order to attract them to off-peak scheduling. 
Congestion in Europe: 
Congestion within the European industries has been equally problematic. 
Substantial growth of air traffic over the past twenty years has seen steadily 
increasing pressure applied to a system with limited capacity for growth (Ott, 1988). 
The very nature of Europe, with a multitude of countries bound together, has dictated 
a co-operative approach to alleviating the congestion problem. Recognising the 
interrelation of airspace and airport congestion throughout Europe, the need for a 
centralised air traffic control system was similarly apparent. The establishment of 
Eurocontrol thus laid the groundwork for a truly European industry (Ott, 1988). 
Deregulation in Europe has not been without problems, however, with some 
countries maintaining some form of protectionism over their industries citing efficient 
utilisation and employment protection as cause (Reed, 1996). 
The European approach toward battling congestion problems has been two-fold. In 
contrast to the U.S., the European industry has applied an optimisation approach to 
traffic flow through air traffic management and has largely achieved a co-operative 
approach to management of scheduling (National Air traffic Service (U.K.) (NATS), 
1993). The exception to this being the Federal Republic of Germany which has 
taken legislative measures to control traffic levels at its international airports 
(Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH (DFS), 1996). 
The efficiency of the optimisation approach to congestion has been reflected in the 
higher utilisation rates and enhanced capacity achieved at European airports, notably 
London Gatwick and London Heathrow (NATS, 1996). Indeed, the superiority of this 
approach is evident in the attempts of the U.S. industry to effect similar methods. 
Phillips (1996) describes a dynamic air traffic management system known as Free 
Flight, which is currently under development in the U.S. Simpson (1993) andCoogal 
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(1996) support this with descriptions of other U.S. initiated plans for global air traffic 
management systems. 
European Deregulation: 
True deregulation of the European industry has been a gradual process which is not 
yet at its completion. Reed (1996) has described fears that the U.S. trend toward 
smaller aircraft on a more frequent basis would be an outcome of complete European 
deregulation. This has not been the case, however. Extreme levels of demand 
combined with capped capacity levels have engendered a consistent trend toward 
larger aircraft types - precisely the opposite of the U.S. experience. Reed (1996) 
reports a trend by airlines to transfer landing rights to medium and long haul flights 
(which are operated by large aircraft), and attributes this greatly to short haul 
competition from high speed rail networks. Passengers are finding it more 
convenient to utilise other forms of transport for short trips, rather than coping with 
the inconveniences associated with air travel amongst congestion. 
The fact of larger aircraft being more prevalent in Europe is reflected in the technical 
investigations of European aircraft manufacturers. Sparaco (1995) describes French 
manufacturer Aerospatiale's studies into the merits of very high capacity, flying wing 
commercial transport. "Aerospatiale expects that steady traffic growth will eventually 
necessitate higher capacity transports and greatly reduced operating costs. The 
flying wing transport would carry 800 -1000 passengers and prevent airspace and 
airport congestion." 
Congestion in Asia: 
Growing traffic levels throughout Asia has led also to pressure on capacity 
constraints. Carlos Chua, President of the Orient Airlines Association says that 
airlines are facing greater airport constraints than ever in 1995, with airport 
congestion and noise curfews impeding aircraft utilisation rates (Meecham, 1995). 
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While conceding that a European style centralised air traffic control system is 
becoming a necessity in the battle against delays, Meecham suggests that Asian 
countries would be slow to embrace the concept. This he attributes to sovereignty 
issues, with nations hesitant about giving up their own enroute radar controls in 
favour of a satellite based navigation system. 
Whilst Asia has avoided the U.S. problem of small aircraftencrescence, the use of 
large aircraft has its own problems arising from airport congestion and the slow turn-
arounds associated with large passenger loads. The most significant is the pressure 
applied to profitability through low aircraft utilisation rates (Meecham, 1995). 
Deregulation in New Zealand: 
Deregulation in New Zealand in 1987 saw the immediate introduction of a competitor 
for the National carrier, Air New Zealand in the form of Ansett New Zealand. Since 
its inception, Ansett has quickly duplicated Air New Zealand's schedules and 
attracted a 45% market share (Air New Zealand Annual Report, 1995). 
While this competition benefits the consumer in that more frequent flights options are 
available, competition has created serious congestion problems at New Zealand's 
major airports - particularly Auckland and Wellington (Mclean, 1991). Competition 
in any industry results in increased response to consumer demand. In the case of air 
transport this means more frequent flight availability. Wellington airport, for example, 
has experienced a 30% rise in traffic levels since 1991 (Macleod & Webb, 1997). Of 
more concern, however, is changes in the type of aircraft using Wellington airport. 
Macleod & Webb (1997) detail the changes as a 5% decrease in mainstream 
transport such as the Boeing 737 and Bae 146 (Whisper Jet), and a 27% decrease in 
medium range aircraft such as the ATR72. This is countered by a 32% rise in the 
number of light commuter transports. These figures represent the proportions of 
each group in the total mix of aircraft using Wellington airport. Both passenger 
numbers and aircraft numbers have increased, but the growth rate of aircraft 
numbers is by far the higher. This is a direct indication of the trend toward smaller 
aircraft. 
14 
The result of this down-sizing of aircraft types, of course, is that more flights are 
required to carry the same number of passengers. This causes severe congestion at 
Wellington given that, as the 'business capital' of New Zealand, most people wish to 
travel at the same time. Consequently, Wellington experiences extreme morning and 
evening peak demand periods where delays commonly exceed 45 minutes 
(Macleod & Webb, 1997). 
The costs associated with airborne delay are significant. Cost, in this case is limited 
to fuel - fuel burned by aircraft flying holding patterns and fuel burned as aircraft 
carry extra fuel to enable them to hold. Given that fuel costs are one of the major 
economic considerations of airline operators, the cost to the industry becomes 
apparent. 
Also to be considered is the possibility of diversions caused by excessive delay - that 
is, when aircraft cannot wait any longer to land and must go elsewhere. The fuel cost 
in this case may not be limited to holding and diversions, but may include additional 
flights as passengers must be on-flown. Safety considerations and customer 
relations cannot be improved by this eventuality. 
Asia / Pacific Region Forecast 
A regional forecast entitled "Asia Pacific Air Traffic Growth and Constraints" (1997), 
published by the Air Transport Action Group (ATAG) predicts a high rate of growth 
throughout the Asia / Pacific region. ATAG is an "independent coalition of 
organisations from throughout the air transport industry which have united to press 
for economically beneficial aviation capacity improvements in an environmentally 
responsible manner"; the report is based on an International Air Transport 
Association (lATA) traffic forecast covering this region of the world and published in 
1997. 
Domestic passenger numbers within New Zealand are shown to have increased from 
2.7 million in 1985 to 4 million in 1995 a rise of 48%. Similarly, international 
passenger traffic has grown 109% from 2.2 million to 4.6 million. Growth between 
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1995 and 2010 is forecast as 105% domestic passenger growth to 8.6 million in 2010 
and 137% international passenger growth to 10.9 million. 
The average annual rate of growth for the period 1985-1995 is 5.7%. The 
forecasted average annual rate of growth 1995-2010 is 5.4%. As the major 
international as well as domestic New Zealand ports, this level of forecasted growth 
has significant ramifications for particularly for Wellington and Auckland airports. 
Notable conclusions of this report are: 
1. Demand for air travel in the Asia/Pacific region is growing faster than in any other 
world region. It is forecast to grow by an average of 7.4% per annum between 
1995 and 2010. 
2. The ability of airlines to respond to this increase in demand by increasing load 
factors, seat densities and aircraft size will be limited. Most of the capacity 
growth will come from an increased number of flights. 
Discussion 
Airport and airspace congestion is a problem fast reaching global proportions. 
Although technological solutions may help ease the difficulties experienced in 
airspace congestion, the final limiting factor on air travel must be the number of 
aircraft that can be accommodated by the world's airports. With noise curfews and 
space limitations constraining airport capacity, it is essential that the most efficient 
usage of available capacity be achieved. The most efficient solutions appear to have 
been found by the European industries who adopt a centralised air traffic control 
system and manage demand through co-operative methods. 
Deregulation of air transport industries often encourages the use of smaller aircraft 
so as to provide frequent flight options for the consumer. Particularly at Wellington 
airport, extreme levels of delay are apparent during peak times. Because the 
majority of traffic at Wellington is business oriented, it is unlikely that attempting to 
shift demand through pricing structures will be an effective solution. An air traffic 
management system similar to that employed in Europe is likely to be a far more 
effective solution. By limiting the number of aircraft which may use an airport within a 
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given time frame, airlines are forced to utilise larger aircraft in order to meet 
consumer demand. 
It is evident that the New Zealand air transport industry is experiencing similar 
outcomes of deregulation as those of the U.S. industry. It is also apparent that 
attempting to solve congestion problems via pricing structures which endeavour to 
spread demand will have no greater success than in the U.S. industry. However, the 
economic and safety considerations of the current levels of delay dictate that the 
industry address this problem now. The required outcome is a reversal of the current 
trend and forecasts of smaller more frequent services so that larger aircraft are 
utilised to meet consumer demand. Only by these means may demand be satisfied 
without resultant congestion. 
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Data Collection 
The information presented in this research is drawn from five main sources. 
1. Airways Corporation Aeronautical Fixed Telecommunications Network (AFTN) 
has been the source of both airport traffic schedules, and of flight plan 
information. Traffic schedules have been utilised in the determination of 
distribution and level of demand at each of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, 
Nelson and Palmerston North airports. It has also been used in the 
determination of aircraft type mix using these airports. 
Flight plan information is the planned route and duration of individual flights. This 
information has been used, in conjunction with actual flight duration data, to 
determine levels of delay. 
2. Airways Corporation Aviation Traffic Database (ATDb) is the source of arrival and 
departure times of individual aircraft movements. Data has been drawn 
corresponding to the peak demand periods at Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch 
and Nelson airports (identified from traffic schedules). This information has been 
used in the determination of airport throughput, growth, type mix changes and 
individual airborne delays. The periods monitored have been: 
Wellington Airport: Morning and evening peaks, 0730 - 1000 and 1630 - 2000. 
Data has been collected on a daily basis for the 10 month period April 1997 -
January 1998 and encompasses some 43,713 individual aircraft movements. 
Auckland I Christchurch I Nelson Airports: Owing to more evenly distributed 
demand the period reviewed at Auckland, Christchurch and Nelson airports has been 
0700 - 2000 for the two month period October 1997 - November 1997. Arrival and 
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departure times of some 30,443 aircraft at Auckland, 17,193 at Christchurch, and 
4,067 at Nelson have been recorded. 
3. Weather information has been collected for Auckland and Wellington airports 
over a period of 14 and 19 months, respectively. This information is actual 
aerodrome reports, which are updated on an ongoing basis whenever some 
parameter - such as cloud or wind - alters. 
4. Aircraft performance information, specifically fuel burn, has been drawn from a 
report entitled "Aircraft Performance Summary Tables for BADA Revision 2.3" 
and issued by Eurocontrol's Experimental Research Facility at Bretigny-sur-Orge 
in France. This report, contains a setof aircraft performance summary tables for 
the 65 aircraft types modeled by the Base of Aircraft Data (BADA) Revision 2.3. 
For each aircraft type, the performance tables specify the true air speed, rate of 
climb/descent and fuel flow for conditions of climb, cruise and descent at various 
flight levels. The performance figures contained within the tables are calculated 
based on a total-energy model and BADA 2.3 performance co-efficients. 
5. Airport capacity for Auckland and Wellington airports is drawn from capacity 
studies undertaken by this author for the Airways Corporation of New Zealand 
Ltd. Shown are theoretical maximum capacity and realistic 'declared' capacity 
levels for both airports. A single runway capacity is calculated for Christchurch 
airport using the same methodology, and this is used for comparative purposes 
with Auckland and Wellington. Capacity for these models was calculated using 
the following method: 
• Individual aircraft speed and performance was drawn initially from aircraft 
performance files held by Airways Corporations Aircat air traffic control system. 
• Aircraft speeds and performance characteristics were then observed (via radar 
monitor) and actual performance compared with that given by the performance 
files. Some 10,000 takeoffs and landings were observed. 
• The average of the above figures was used as a standard performance measure 
for individual aircraft types. This standard was represented as a distance and 
height measure at fifteen second intervals. 
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• The standard performance measure for each aircraft when incorporated with the 
minimum allowable air traffic control separation (which varies with weather 
conditions) gives a measure of capacity for various weather states. That is, a 
measure of how many aircraft may utilise a runway system within a given time 
frame (usually an hourly rate). The measure may be used to depict exact 
situations and aircraft movements, or used to estimate a more 'general' case. 
Interpretation of Data 
Delay 
Delay, as described by this research, refers to the airborne delay experienced by 
individual aircraft in flight to Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Nelson airports. 
Cause of delay is not described here, being one of the intended findings of this 
investigation. The focus of this thesis is congestion and its effects. Unavoidable 
delay caused by such things as runway closure due to fog or accident is outside the 
scope of this research. Days on which this has occurred have therefore been 
excluded. 
Drawing on information collected from Airways Corporations ATDb, duration of flight 
has been calculated as the difference between departure and arrival time. Intended 
duration has been provided by aircraft flight plans, collected from Airways 
Corporations AFTN. Delay to individual aircraft has then been calculated as the 
difference between the planned duration of a flight, and its actual duration. 
Delay is then presented for each airport as: 
1. Total minutes of delay incurred over period of investigation 
2. Total minutes of delay by aircraft type over period of investigation 
3. Average delay during peak demand periods 
4. Average delay during peak periods for various weather conditions 
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Cost of Delay 
The cost of delay is restricted to estimates in terms of fuel burnt during airborne 
delay. Associated costs such as crews, schedule disruption, passenger 
inconvenience and the cost of aircraft carrying fuel to enable airborne holding is not 
included. As such, this is a limited indication of the true cost of delays, but is 
nevertheless indicative of the economic effects of airport congestion in New Zealand. 
Fuel burn is estimated for each aircraft type from aircraft performance summary 
tables issued by Eurocontrol. Fuel consumed in flight varies with altitude and with 
aircraft weight. Airborne delay, for the purposes of this estimation is calculated as 
having occurred at the standard descent levels of 7,000 feet for aircraft arriving from 
relatively close airports such as Nelson, and 13,000 feet from airports further afield. 
Light aircraft and E110 Bandierante traffic is calculated at 4,000 feet. 
Information is presented as: 
• Fuel cost estimated for each aircraft type in airborne delay 
• Fuel burn matched to total minutes of delay by aircraft type, to estimate the cost 
of airborne delay over the period investigated. 
Annual delay is estimated from average delay during stated weather conditions, and 
proportions of each weather condition which have occurred during the past year. 
This data is available for Auckland and Wellington airports. 
Information is presented as: 
1. Estimated annual delay 
2. Estimated annual fuel cost 
Demand 
Demand for airport services, as presented by this research, is scheduled air transport 
operations. It does not include private or training operations. Daily schedules have 
been drawn from Airways Corporations AFTN over the following periods: 
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Auckland: 4 months 
Wellington: 14 months 
Christchurch: 1 month 
Nelson: 1 month 
Comparison of daily schedules has revealed small variations, particularly with 
international aircraft movements. Schedule information shown in this research is not 
average scheduled demand, but rather is actual data which conforms closely to 
average weekday schedules. 
As expected, weekend and holiday scheduled demand has been found to be 
distributed differently to 'normal' weekday schedules, and substantially lower. 
Weekend days and holidays have been excluded from this data. 
Schedule information has been presented as hourly demand, allowing easy 
identification of peak demand periods. Peak periods are then shown in greater 
detail, as ten minute intervals incorporating arrival and departure proportions. 
Airport Capacity 
Airport capacity is calculated through the use of capacity models developed for the 
Airways Corporation by this author, and released as the Wellington Air Traffic 
Management Study (1997), Wellington Air Traffic Management Study (1998), and the 
Auckland Capacity Study (1997). The same methodology is used to present a single 
runway capacity for Christchurch airport. 
These capacity models utilise aircraft performance data, which was determined from 
performance files held by Airways Corporation and through observation of arriving 
and departing aircraft. Also utilised by these models is runway occupancy data, 
which was determined through the observa~ion of some 1100 take-offs and landings 
at Wellington airport, and 500 at Auckland. 
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Descriptions of the factors which affect capacity are made, and capacity statements for 
Auckland and Wellington airports are provided. Single runway capacity for Christchurch 
airport is modelled, and a comparison between Auckland and Christchurch capacity is drawn. 
Causes of Delay 
Explicit causes of delay are identified through a comparison of airport capacity and 
levels of demand. The effects of various factors which combine to determine 
capacity are examined and a comparison between airports is used to determine the 
extent to which each is a cause of delay. 
Limitations of Research 
The main limitations of this research arise from limitations of data accuracy. The 
primary sources of data are Airways Corporations AFTN and ATDb. The limitations 
on this data are as follows: 
1. Schedule information gathered from the AFTN does not include itinerant traffic or 
schedule alterations. The positive aspect of this is that scheduled operations are 
isolated from 'one-off or infrequent traffic. Also, it provides an explicit account of 
normally planned air transport operations. The negative aspect is that, by 
excluding itinerant traffic, total planned demand is not shown. This may include 
IFR traffic which is airline additions or air transport charter operations. Further, 
traffic schedules do not take into account the deviation from scheduled time, 
which occurs on a daily basis. 
23 
2. Flight plan information, which provides the planned duration of flights from which 
delay duration is derived may not contain time for approach. The effect of this is 
variable but, using Wellington as an example, will approximate the following: 
Flight plans for flights to Wellington from Nelson and Blenheim normally include the 
instrument approach point. The effect of this is accurate planned duration during 
instrument conditions, and possible underestimation of delay during visual conditions 
- due to the flight planned route being slightly abbreviated. 
Flight plans for flights which originate from the Auckland and Hamilton direction 
usually include Tory VOR as an enroute point to Wellington. If Runway 16 is in use 
at Wellington, flights are likely (but not certain) to short cut the planned route by flying 
direct to Titahi Bay to commence approach. This would cause an under-estimate of 
any delay. If Tory VOR is not circumvented" delay will be over-estimated because 
the instrument approach is not included in the planned duration of flight. If Runway 
34 is in use, aircraft must fly further south than is included in the flight plan - resulting 
in overestimate of delay during instrument conditions, but will be accurate for visual 
conditions. 
The opposite occurs for flights originating from a southern direction. These plans are 
direct to Wellington and will be accurate for Runway 34, but may lead to overestimate 
of delay for Runway 16 where aircraft must proceed further North to commence an 
instrument approach. These are necessary and integral parts of flight and are not an 
effect of congestion. These details, however, are not included in the standard plan 
data which is filed with Airways AFTN. 
The effects of this are similar at Christchurch airport. Auckland is also affected, but 
due to runway orientation, the effect is smaller. 
In all cases, some flight planned durations will be shorter than actual duration and 
some will exceed it. This will be balanced, to some extent by opposite direction 
traffic, and by use on other days of the opposite runway vector. It is considered, 
however, that delays of less than six minutes duration (which is the approximate time 
taken by an aircraft for one lap of a holding pattern) is due to data limitations, rather 
than actual airborne delay. 
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3. Arrival times in ATDb. While information held in ATDb is extremely accurate for 
departures which is radar information from an aircraft on the runway during its 
take-off roll, it is not as accurate for aircraft arrival times. Aircraft arrival times are 
recorded manually by airport tower personnel. The accuracy required is -5 or 
+10 minutes. Comparison with timed arrivals indicates that these times are 
usually accurate to within 2 minutes. 
Delay, as presented by this research, deals only with airborne delays. No attempt 
has been made to produce data on ground based delay. This is primarily due to the 
difficulty of accurate data collection, and the limitations of time andresources which a 
single person could devote. 
Ground based delay (due to congestion) cannot be measured as the time differential 
between planned departure time and actual. This is because of the many possible 
causes which are unrelated to airport congestion - E.g. Aircraft engineering 
problems, late passengers, late arrival of aircraft, etc. Rather, delay due to 
congestion must be air traffic control instructed delay. 
When an IFR aircraft is nearing readiness for departure, start and enroute clearances 
are requested from air traffic control. If a queue of departures already exists, start 
clearance will not be given. This avoids large numbers of aircraft queuing with 
engines running (and hence burning fuel) at a holding point. This queue is generally 
restricted to four or five aircraft. Ground based delay, therefore must be considered 
as time spent waiting at a holding point plus start delay incurred. Measurement 
of this delay would be very time consuming and would require the co-operation of 
airport tower personnel. 
In addition, there is some question over the accuracy of any measurement of this 
data. In a survey of runway occupancy times undertaken by this author, and 
encompassing some 1200 aircraft movements at Wellington airport, the time taken 
for aircraft to reach the holding point after start clearance delivery was also recorded. 
During busy or congested periods, this time was noticeably longer in some cases 
than during non-congested periods. In the absence of any other reason, it is 
concluded that in some cases pilots will call for start clearance prior to readiness in 
order to avoid being placed in a queue, or to minimise time spent in that queue. The 
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accuracy of departure delay recording, especially during peak demand periods, is 
therefore questionable. 
In the absence of any solution to this dilemma, and accepting the restraints of time 
and resources, departure delays are not presented by this research. 
It is not considered, however, that absence of ground based data significantly 
detracts from the value of this research. This is for the following reasons: 
• Ground based delay prior to engine start uses no fuel, and minimal fuel after 
start. The vast majority of the cost of delay in terms of fuel burn occurs during 
airborne delay. It is cost due to fuel burn that this research seeks to estimate. 
• In a system (such as Wellington and Christchurch airports) where equal priority is 
given to arriving and departing flights, ground based delay will be equal to, or 
more likely, less than airborne delay. 
• At airports such as Auckland, where departures are given priority over arrivals or 
at Christchurch, where demand is well below airport capacity, any ground based 
departure delay will be very small 
Airport Capacity. The capacity scenarios utilised in this research are the result of 
average 'normal' airport capacity. Any deviation in terms of aircraft type mix, arrival! 
departure mix, or any of the other factors which influence capacity will cause slight 
changes in actual capacity. 
Weather Conditions. Any given time period will be generally classified as visual 
conditions, instrument, etc. This does not guarantee equal conditions, however. For 
example, one day which is classified as visual may be turbulent with strong gusty 
winds while another is calm. Similarly, one instrument conditions day may have a 
cloud base low enough to require an instrument approach to be flown for only a short 
distance before conditions allow the remainder to be flown by visual reference. 
Aircraft Fuel Burn. Fuel consumption by aircraft is directly related to aircraft weight 
and condition of flight. The performance summary tables presented in the BADA 
report specify fuel consumption for low, nominal and high mass levels. Fuel 
consumption at nominal weight has been utilised in this research, but it is recognised 
that actual aircraft weight (and hence fuel flow) may differ. Further, this fuel 
consumption data is specified for aircraft in the cruise phase of flight. Particularly in 
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the case of jet aircraft, the speed at which they fly in a holding pattern may differ from 
that at which the same aircraft would cruise at that level. Any difference in speed will 
affect fuel consumption. Because cruising speeds are generally calculated to 
produce the most efficient combination of speed and fuel consumption, it is likely that 
fuel flow in a hold will be higher. 
Flight Levels. The flight levels at which aircraft are delayed are variable. Aircraft 
use differing amounts of fuel at low altitudes than high, thus any deviation from the 
levels assumed in this research will produce differing results. The flight levels 
assumed by this research are: F130 (13,000' ) for jet aircraft; 7,000' for medium 
category turbo-prop aircraft; and 4,000' for all others. Observation indicates that 
these levels accurately reflect a general case scenario, but it is acknowledged that 
deviation from these levels will occur frequently. 
Delay to intemational aircraft. It has not been possible to measure the delay incurred 
by international aircraft because of limitation of data sources. Airways Corporation's 
AFTN system does not hold information on flight duration or departure times for 
flights which originate outside the New Zealand flight data processing system. In 
order to gain this information, it would be necessary to access the systems of other 
countries. Because no system of allocating priority to these flights exists within New 
Zealand, however, it is reasonable to assume the incursion of average delay. This 
method has been chosen in calculation of the cost of delay. 
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AUCKLAND AIRPORT 
Airborne delay has been measured at Auckland airport on weekdays over the two 
month period October I November 1997. The period monitored is 0700 - 2000 local 
time. Peak period runway throughput is also measured. Delay has been determined 
for a total of 15,206 arriving aircraft. Aircraft mix over this measured period does not 
include international traffic. Figure 4.1 shows distribution of aircraft types for which 
delay has been determined. 
Figure 4.1 : Auckland Measured traffic Mix 
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No significant difference is seen in the amount of delay incurred by each aircraft type, 
nor does weather condition appear to significantly affect the level of delay. 
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Figure 4.2: Average Delay by Weather Condition 
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Total delay measured over 15,206 aircraft was 57,782 minutes, at an average of 3.8 
minutes per aircraft. Delay during instrument conditions is higher than during visual 
conditions, but the difference is only 0.8 minutes. Average delay during the peak 
hours 0800-0900 and 1800-1900 is higher at 6 and 5 minutes, respectively. 
Throughput differs slightly, averaging 35 aircraft per hour during instrument 
conditions and 38 on visual days. 
Figure 4.3: Average Throughput by Weather Condition 
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Visual Instrument 
Weather conditions at Auckland have been recorded over the8 month period July 
1997 - February 1998. Data recording is for the peak period 0700 - 2000. Figure 
4.4 shows weather conditions distribution. 
Figure 4.4: Auckland Weather Distribution 
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Visual conditions predominate at Auckland, and conditions that are below circling 
minima occur only 1.1 % of the time. These conditions include occurrence of fog. 
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CHRISTCHURCH AIRPORT 
Airborne delay at Christchurch has been monitored over the same period as 
Auckland - October I November 1997 and also January I February 1998 0700-2000 
local time. Delay was determined for 8,570 aircraft. Figure 4.6 shows aircraft type 
distribution. 
Figure 4.6: Christchurch Measured Traffic Mix 
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Like Auckland, no difference was discernible in allocation of delay between aircraft 
types. Weather data is not available for the entire period, monitored only January I 
February 1998. Figure 4.7 shows distribution of weather conditions over thistwo 
month period. 
Figure 4.7: Christchurch Weather distribution Jan 
I Feb 1998 
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No difference is evident in delay level on various days. Average delay during visual 
conditions was 3.2 minutes and during instrument conditions was 3.4 minutes. It is 
unlikely that weather significantly affects delay at Christchurch airport (runway 
closure I fog excepted). 
Total delay measured over 8,570 aircraft was 27,446 minutes. Throughput at 
Christchurch is also low, averaging 20 aircraft movements per hour with little 
variation throughout the day. 
WELLINGTON AIRPORT 
Airborne delay at Wellington has been measured on weekdays over the10 month 
period April 1997 - January 1998, inclusive. The periods monitored have been 0730 
- 1000 and 1630 - 2000 local time. Peak hour runway throughput (number of aircraft 
movements which have taken place) has also been measured over the same period. 
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A total of some 43,713 aircraft movements have been recorded. 21,815 of these 
are arriving aircraft for which level of delay has been determined. 
It is notable that the aircraft type mix during these peaks differs slightly from the 
overall mix of scheduled aircraft. Figure 4.8 below shows how type mix differs. 
20 
>c 15 
i 
'5 10 
G) 
S5 
c: 
~ 0 
G) 
~ -5 
-10 
Figure 4.8: Percen tage Change· Peak Period Aircraft 
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E110 Bandierante aircraft make up a much higher proportion of peak period traffic 
mix than total traffic mix. ATR 72 aircraft are also slightly more prolific, while all other 
type proportions are diminished. Figure 4.9 shows traffic mix during peak periods. 
Figure 4.9: Wellington Peak Period Traffic Mix 
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The total amount of airborne delay measured over this period was 85,427 minutes -
equating to an average of 3.92 minutes per aircraft. Delay is not apportioned evenly, 
however. Figures 4.10 and 4.11 show this disproportion. 
Figure 4.10: Percentage of Airborne Delay 
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Figure 4.11: Percentage of Aircraft Mix and Delay 
The total number of minutes delay incurred by each aircraft type and its average 
delay is shown by Figure 4.12 and Table 1 below. 
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Fig ure 4.12: Average Delay by Aircraft Type 
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Table 1: 
Minutes and Average Delay by Aircraft Type 
Aircraft Type Number of Aircraft Minutes Delay Average Delay 
• 
Other 124 420 3.39 
Singles 129 254 1.97 
DH8 844 4949 5.86 
ATR 1053 7137 6.78 
L TWINS 1082 3697 3.42 
SW3 1903 9694 5.09 
BA46 2474 11370 4.60 
SF34 2668 16196 6.07 
B737 3064 17383 5.67 
E110 8474 14327 1.69 
TOTAL 21815 85427 3.92 
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Delays incurred are not equal over all weather conditions. Figure 4.13 below depicts 
average delay incurred during the weather conditions of Visual, Instrument above 
circling minima, and Instrument below circling minima. 
12 
10 
8 
6 
4 
2 
o 
Figure 4.13: Average Delay by Weather Condition 
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It can be seen from this that delay increases as weather conditions deteriorate - the 
greatest levels of delay occur when the weather is below circling minima. Achieved 
runway throughput - the number of movements which take place in a given time - is 
not constant either. Figure 4.14 below shows average hourly peak period runway 
. throughput. 
Figure 4.14: Average Throughput by Weather Condition 
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Average runway throughput remains constant through visual and instrument above 
circling minima conditions, but is significantly lower during instrument conditions 
below circling minima. 
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Throughput is lowest, and delays highest during conditions below circling. Because 
demand from IFR air transport aircraft is unchanged by weather condition, this 
suggests that airport capacity is exceeded during below circling conditions. Average 
throughput during visual and above circling conditions is constant. Delay, however, 
is higher during above circling conditions. Given the limitations of ATDb data, it is not 
immediately clear whether delay is due to excess demand for either condition. An 
investigation of demand and airport capacity is required to determine this. 
Weather conditions at Wellington have been recorded over the past 19 months, 
between the hours of 0500 and 2400. Figures 4.15 and 4.16 show variation of 
weather conditions over the course of the day and during peak demand periods. 
Figure 4.15: Wellington Total Weather Distribution 
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There is little difference between peak periods and total weather distribution. The 
slight increase of visual conditions in favour of instrument conditions is due to less 
darkness hours during peak periods. 
Some seasonal variation is indicated, also largely due to hours of darkness with 
respect to visual versus instrument conditions. During below circling conditions, no 
seasonal variation is apparent, but data collection over a greater time period is 
required to confirm this. 
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Figure 4.17: Wellington Weather Distibution 
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Figure 4.18: Wellington Peak Period Weather Distribution 
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Closer examination of occurrence of below circling minima conditions is given by 
figures 4.19 and 4.20. 
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Figure 4.19: Wellington Below Circling Occurence 
Figure 4.20: Wellington Peak Period Below Circling Occurence 
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Similar distribution is seen during both peak demand periods and throughout the day. 
This suggests consistency of weather state. In other words, weather conditions -
good or bad - are unlikely to be brief. 
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Delays at any of New Zealand's major airports are likely to have substantial on-going 
effects. These occur in two ways: 
Networking: An aircraft that incurs delay may cause similar delays to other aircraft if 
it is carrying passengers who are connecting to other flights. For example, an aircraft 
flying from Nelson to Wellington is likely to carry passengers whose final destination 
is Auckland, Christchurch, or some other place. In this case, the aircraft departing 
Wellington for these destinations will be delayed awaiting their passengers. 
Schedule disruption: Any aircraft that incurs delay at one airport is likely to be late 
at its next destination. Although it may be possible for some time to be made up in 
faster turn-around on the ground, or increased speed in the air, the amount of time 
that may be saved in this way is small. For example, the maximum possible time a 
Boeing 737 could save flying between Auckland and Wellington would be 
approximately five minutes, although it would need favourable flying conditions to do 
so. On shorter routes, the possible time aircraft can save in the air is lower. A fifteen 
minute delay, then, will take several flights to recoup. 
It can be seen then, that the effects of congestion can be wide ranging and will affect 
operations at other airports, whether those airports suffer congestion or not. A 
substantial delay, say 45 minutes, will probably disrupt airline operations throughout 
the course of the day. 
While total demand at Nelson is not high, the level of Wellington-Nelson traffic 
amongst total traffic at Nelson is significant. Although situated on the opposite side 
of Cook Strait, Nelson falls within domain of the Wellington business district. A great 
deal of commuting between these centres, therefore is done by both Public and 
Private sector business people, as well as by the general public. Unlike most of New 
Zealand's other provincial towns, which have easy access by either road or rail to the 
region's major city, access to Wellington from Nelson is more difficult. The 
alternative option to air transport is travel by road to Picton, followed by a 3.5 hour 
ferry crossing of Cook Strait. 
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As a consequence, demand for air travel between Nelson and Wellington on a 
frequent basis is higher than experienced at other provincial townships which 
experience a greater level of choice in convenient forms of travel. This high 
frequency of flights is a substantial contributor to congestion at Wellington, and can 
cause a similar problem at Nelson airport. 
The close vicinity of Nelson to Wellington creates a situation where the flight time on 
this route differs little between aircraft. Aircraft departing Wellington in quick 
succession will arrive at Nelson at similar close time intervals. Nelson does not have 
the benefit of radar assistance - rather, during instrument conditions aircraft are 
separated by time intervals. The rate at which aeroplanes can depart Wellington 
during instrument conditions is greater than the rate at which they may arrive at 
Nelson. 
This becomes a problem when weather conditions at both Wellington and Nelson are 
poor. When congestion occurs at Wellington, departing jets often gain priority from 
their operators. As a result, light and medium turboprop aircraft tend to depart 
Wellington within a smaller time frame than would otherwise be the case. This can 
result in a succession of aircraft departing Wellington bound for Nelson. If the 
weather at Nelson is fine, this presents no problems. If, however, the weather at 
Nelson is also poor then substantial delays can result, despite the relatively low level 
of scheduled demand at this airport. 
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The purpose of this thesis is not to provide a detailed scrutiny of the monetary cost of 
delays. It seeks, rather, to provide a detailed investigation of airport congestion. No 
attempt, therefore, is made to provide an account of the true economic cost to the air 
transport industry - cost which must include fuel burn, the cost of carrying extra fuel, 
air and ground crews, maintenance and wear - or an account of the cost in terms of 
passenger dissatisfaction and inconvenience. The economic cost of airport 
congestion is, however, a consequence of this problem which must be considered as 
the primary incentive to effect a solution. 
The cost of delay is therefore presented here as total annual time lost in airborne 
delay, and as an estimate of the fuel burnt by aircraft as a result of this delay. 
Fuel usage data for each aircraft type has been drawn from a 1995 Eurocontrol 
report, entitled 'Aircraft Performance Summary Tables for BADA revision 2.3'. Fuel 
usage at nominal weight has been utilised here. 
It should be noted that actual fuel usage may be higher than this rate because 
aircraft fly at a slower speed than normal cruise during holding. Further, fuel usage is 
dependent upon the height at which an aircraft flies. In general, the higher an aircraft 
is, the lower its rate of fuel burn. For the purposes of estimating fuel used, aircraft 
have been assumed to be held at the following levels: 
FL 130 (13,000') 
7,000' 
4,000' 
All heavy and medium jets (includes B767, B737, BA46) 
All medium turboprop aircraft and SW3 Metroliner 
E110 Bandierante, all piston-engine aircraft 
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Estimated fuel burn for each aircraft type at these levels is as follows: 
8747 220.3 Kg/min DH8 7.6 Kg/min 
MD11 134.4 SF34·· 11.7 
8767 82 SW3 4.1 
8737 32.6 E110 4.0 
8A46 23.7 Twins 2.8 
ATR 9.2 Singles 0.5 
Delay incurred by international aircraft has not been ascertained. For the purpose of 
estimating the cost of delay, international aircraft are assumed to incur the average 
delay. Refer data limitations, (4) pg. 27. 
AUCKLAND AIRPORT 
In 1997, 127,412 IFR movements took place. This equates to an average of 349 
movements per day, of which approximately 175 will be arriving aircraft. Average 
delay during visual conditions is 3.6 minutes; during instrument conditions it is 4.1 
minutes. 
Total daily delay therefore is: 
175 x 3.6 = 630 minutes in visual conditions 
175 x 4.1 = 718 minutes in instrument conditions 
Instrument conditions occur 33.6% of the time at Auckland; visual conditions 65.3%. 
The remaining 1.1 % is below circling conditions, including fog. Delay is likely to be 
higher during these conditions if runway closure results. Delay due to fog and/or 
runway closure is not calculated here. 
Instrument conditions = 33.6% of 365 days = 123 days per year 
= 238 days per year Visual conditions = 65.3% of 365 days 
Total Annual Delay = (123 x 630) + (238 x 718) 
= 77,490 + 170,884 
= 248,374 minutes per year 
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No significant difference is discernible in the amount of delay incurred by each type 
of aircraft at Auckland. Average delay is therefore assumed for all types. Estimated 
fuel cost is given by the following calculation. 
Auckland Aircraft Mix: 8747 7% of 248,374 = 17,386 minutes 
MD11 1% of 248,374 = 2,484 minutes 
8767 6% of 248,374 = 14,902 minutes 
8737 18% of 248,374 = 44,707 minutes 
8A46 14% of 248,374 = 34,772 minutes 
DH8 2% of 248,374 = 4,967 minutes 
SF34 12% of 248,374 = 29,805 minutes 
SW3 13% of 248,374 = 32,289 minutes 
E110 19% of 248,374 = 47,191 minutes 
Other 3% of 248,374 = 7,451 minutes 
Twins 5% of 248,374 = 12,419 minutes 
8747 17,386 minutes @ 220.3 Kg/min = 3,830,136 Kg 
MD11 2,484 minutes @ 134.4 Kg/min = 333,850 
8767 14,902 minutes @ 82 Kg/min = 1,221,964 
8737 44,707 minutes @ 32.6 Kg/min = 1,437,888 
8A46 34,772 minutes @ 23.7 Kg/min = 824,096 
DH8 4,967 minutes @ 7.6 Kg/min = 37,749 
SF34 29,805 minutes @ 11.7 Kg/min = 348,719 
SW3 32,289 minutes @ 4.1 Kg/min = 132,385 
E110 47,191 minutes @ 4 Kg/min = 188,764 
Other 7,451 minutes @ 20 Kg/min = 149,020 
Twins 12,419 minutes @ 2.8 Kg/min = 34,773 
The annual cost of delay at Auckland airport, in terms of fuel burn is therefore some 
7,101,456 Kg of fuel. This is made up of 5,385,950 Kg burned by international 
aircraft, and a 1,725,506 Kg cost to the domestic transport market. 
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CHRISTCHURCH AIRPORT 
In 1997, Christchurch airport handled 86,430 IFR aircraft movements. This equates 
to an average of 237 movements per day, of which approximately 118 will be arriving 
aircraft. Average delay during visual conditions is 3.2 minutes; during instrument 
conditions it is 3.4 minutes. 
Total daily delay therefore is: 
118 x 3.2 = 378 minutes in visual conditions 
118 x 3.4 = 401 minutes in instrument conditions 
Instrument conditions occur 37% of the time; visual conditions 60%. The remaining 
3% is below circling conditions, including fog. Delay is likely to be higher during 
these conditions if runway closure results. Delay due to fog and/or runway closure is 
not calculated here. 
Instrument conditions = 37% of 365 days = 135 days per year 
= 219 days per year Visual conditions = 60% of 365 days 
Total Annual Delay = (135 x 378) + (219 x 401) 
= 51,030 + 87,819 
= 138,849 minutes per year 
Like Auckland, no significant difference is discernible in the amount of delay incurred 
by each type of aircraft at Christchurch airport. Average delay is therefore assumed 
for all types. Estimated fuel cost is given by the following calculation. 
Auckland Aircraft Mix: B747 4% of 138,849 = 5,554 minutes 
MD11 1% of 138,849 = 1,388 minutes 
B767 1% of 138,849 = 1,388 minutes 
B737 23% of 138,8494 = 31,935 minutes 
BA46 22% of 138,849 = 30,546 minutes 
ATR 18% of 138,849 = 24,993 minutes 
DH8 5% of 138,849 = 6,942 minutes 
SF34 2% of 138,849 = 2,777 minutes 
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SW3 16% of 138,849 = 22,216 minutes 
E110 0% of 138,849 = ° minutes 
Other 4% of 138,849 = 5,554 minutes 
Twins 4% of 138,849 = 5,554 minutes 
B747 5,554 minutes @ 220.3 Kg/min = 1,223,546 Kg 
MD11 1,388 minutes@ 134.4 Kg/min = 186,547 
B767 1,388 minutes @ 82 Kg/min = 113,816 
B737 31,935 minutes @ 32.6 Kg/min = 1,041,081 
BA46 30,546 minutes @ 23.7 Kg/min = 723,940 
ATR 24,993 minutes @ 9.2 Kg/min = 229,936 
DH8 6,942 minutes @ 7.6 Kg/min = 52,759 
SF34 2,777 minutes @ 11.7 Kg/min = 32,491 
SW3 22,216 minutes @ 4.1 Kg/min = 91,086 
E110 ° minutes @ 4 Kg/min = ° Other 5,554 minutes @ 20 Kg/min = 111,080 
Twins 5,554 minutes @ 2.8 Kg/min = 15,551 
The annual cost of delay at Christchurch airport, in terms of fuel burn is therefore 
some 3,821,833 Kg of fuel. This is made up of 1,523,909 Kg burned by international 
aircraft, and a 2,297,924 Kg cost to the domestic transport market. 
WELLINGTON AIRPORT 
Wellington airport is more complex than either Auckland or Christchurch;--Three main 
weather conditions, for which vastly different levels of delay exist, must be 
considered. As well as this, it has been shown that the delay incurred at Wellington 
is not apportioned evenly amongst the aircraft types using the airport. 
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In general, larger aircraft receive a larger portion of the airborne delay than smaller 
aircraft. This is predominately due to ground delays directed by air traffic control. 
That is to say, when queues of aircraft exist at Wellington, ATC will issue ground 
holding instructions to aircraft which are not already enroute. This occurs first at 
close airports such as Blenheim and Nelson, only occurring at airports further afield 
such as Auckland when delays are extreme. For this reason, aircraft departing for 
Wellington from nearby airports (which are usually small aircraft types) will incur 
greater ground delay but lesser airborne delay. 
In 1997, Wellington airport handled 115,414 IFR aircraft movements. This equates to 
316 movements per day, of which approximately 158 will be arriving aircraft. 
Average delay in visual conditions is 3.2 minutes, during instrument conditions it is 
5.1 minutes, and during below circling minima conditions, this rises to 11.3 minutes 
average delay. 
Total daily delay therefore is: 
158 x 3.2 = 507 minutes in visual conditions 
158 x 5.1 = 806 minutes in instrument conditions 
158 x 11.3 = 1785 minutes in below circling conditions 
Visual conditions occur 38% of the time at Wellington; instrument conditions 51%; 
and below circling minima conditions 11 %. Delays due to fog or runway closure is 
excluded from this calculation. 
Visual conditions = 38% of 365 days = 
Instrument conditions = 51% of 365 days = 
Below circling conditions = 11 % of 365 days = 
139 days per year 
186 days per year 
40 days per year 
Total Annual Delay = (139 x 507) + (186 x 806) + (40 x 1785) 
= 70,334 + 149,916 + 71,400 
= 291,650 minutes per year 
It has not been possible to determine the delay incurred by international aircraft. 
Calculation of the cost of delay therefore assumes average delay for international 
46 
traffic, but is more specific for other types. The annual cost of delay is estimated by 
the following calculations: 
Total annual delay = 291,650 minutes 
International traffic (8767) = 2% of traffic = 2% of 291 ,650 = 5,833 minutes 
Remainder of delay = 285,817 minutes. 
Delay allocation by aircraft type: 
B737 20.3% of 285,817 = 58,021 minutes 
BA46 13.3% of 285,817 = 38,014 minutes 
ATR 8.4% of 285,817 = 24,008 minutes 
DH8 5.8% of 285,817 = 16,577 minutes 
SF34 19% of 285,817 = 54,305 minutes 
SW3 11.3% of 285,817 = 32,297 minutes 
E110 16.8% of 285,817 = 48,017 minutes 
Other 0.5% of 285,817 = 1,429 minutes 
Twins 4.3% of 285,817 = 12,290 minutes 
Singles 0.3% of 285,817 = 857 minutes 
B767 5,833 minutes @ 82 Kg/min = 478,306 Kg 
8737 58,021 minutes @ 32.6 Kg/min = 1,891,485 
BA46 30,014 minutes @ 23.7 Kg/min = 711,332 
ATR 24,008 minutes @ 9.2 Kg/min = 220,874 
DH8 16,577 minutes @ 7.6 Kg/min = 125,985 
SF34 54,305 minutes@ 11.7 Kg/min = 635,368 
SW3 32,297 minutes @ 4.1 Kg/min = 132,418 
E110 48,017 minutes @ 4 Kg/min = 192,068 
Other 1,429 minutes @ 20 Kg/min = 28,580 
Twins 12,290 minutes @ 2.8 Kg/min = 34,412 
Singles 857 minutes @ 0.5 Kg/min = 429 
The annual cost of delay at Wellington airport, in terms of fuel burn is therefore some 
4,451,257 Kg of fuel. This is made up of 478,306 Kg burned by international aircraft, 
and a 3,972,951 Kg cost to the domestic transport market. 
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The total minutes of delay at Wellington airport is higher than either Auckland or 
Christchurch. Auckland airport, however, accommodates 11,988 extra movements 
with total delay 43,276 minutes less. Delay recorded during visual and instrument 
conditions is similar, but delay at Wellington during below circling conditions rises 
steeply. Weather conditions below circling minima at Wellingtonoccur only 11% of 
the time. Yet these days account for 24% of the total delay recorded. 
Below circling conditions at Wellington are also the only occasion where delays 
exceed the limitations of data gathering. Delays during all other conditions are within 
the limitations of flight plan and ATDb accuracy. Physical observation of traffic flow 
suggests that small delays may exist at Auckland and Wellington during instrument 
conditions, but that the majority of delay recorded here is due to limitations of data, 
rather than to congestion. No delay has been observed at Christchurch airport, also 
suggesting that recorded delay is due to data limitations. 
During weather conditions below circling minima at Wellington, large delays are 
known to result. Delays recorded during these conditions are most likely the result of 
system overload and congestion. 
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Distribution of Demand 
Amongst New Zealand's many airports, demand from commercial air transport 
services is overwhelmingly centred on Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch 
airports. Total aircraft movements within this country are somewhat more evenly 
spread - Ardmore airport rating as the busiest in the country. However, demand in 
these cases is predominantly made up of General Aviation and training aircraft rather 
than commercial passenger flights. Figure 7.1 below shows total New Zealand traffic 
distribution (exclusive military aerodromes - E.g. Ohakea - are excluded). 
Figure 7.1: New Zealand Airports Total Traffic 
Distribution 
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Refer glossary pg. 120 for aerodrome full name and location. 
This is not indicative of air transport demand, however. The vast majority of air 
transport flights are operated by Instrument Flight Rules (IFR), while a similar 
majority of General Aviation and training flights are operated by visual flight rules 
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(VFR). This research is not concerned with scenic air transport operations, rather 
with commuter passenger transport. A more accurate indication of the distribution of 
air transport demand at New Zealand airports is thus provided by IFR traffic 
distribution. Figure 7.2 depicts this. 
Figure 7.2: New Zealand Airports IFR traffic Distribution 
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Refer glossary pg. 120 for aerodrome full name and location. 
It is clear from this that the vast majority of commuter air traffic is between Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch airports. Indeed, these airports make up 63% of all IFR 
traffic movements in New Zealand and are the main international, as well as 
domestic ports. It is for this reason that these three airports are the main focus of 
this research. 
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Growth of Demand 
Growth of traffic movements throughout New Zealand over the past decade has been 
substantial. This has been in the wake of deregulation and competition. In the past 
three years IFR traffic has increased from 453,542 movements in 1995 to 521,759 in 
1997 - an increase of 68,217 movements or 150/0. Auckland, Wellington and 
Christchurch airports account for 40% of this growth, accommodating 329,256 IFR 
movements in 1997, up 26,889 from 1995. Figure 7.3 below shows total IFR traffic 
growth 1995 -1997 and Figure 7.4 growth at Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch. 
Figure '.3: New Zealand Airports IFR Traffic Growth 
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Two other airports - Nelson and Palmerston North - have experienced significant 
growth in IFR traffic during th is period. They are the only other airports to 
accommodate more than 20,000 annual IFR movements. Figure 7.5 below indicates 
percentage growth. 
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Figure 7.5: Percentage Growth 1995-1997 
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Palmerston North stands out immediately as having experienced a large amount of 
growth, some 3,000 movements or 13.50/0 in 1996 over 1995. This is largely 
attributable, however, to the curfew which was placed on Wellington airport late in 
1995. Wellington is only able to operate between the hours of 0600 - 2300. As a 
result, a large amount of freight is flown via Palmerston North outside these hours, 
then transferred to Wellington by road. This traffic accounts for the majority of the 
growth at Palmerston North, rather than passenger air transport. 
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Figure 7.6: Palmerston North Scheduled traffic 
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Nelson has also experienced significant growth in the past year. But this growth is 
also largely attributable to Wellington - a full 720/0 of all IFR aircraft movements at 
Nelson airport are to or from Wellington. Figure 7.7 shows Nelson scheduled traffic, 
Figure 7.8 shows Nelson/Wellington route profusion. 
Figure 7.7: Nelson Scheduled Traffic 
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Figure 7.8: Nelson Scheduled Traffic I Routes 
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Wellington 
Neither of these airports experience significant levels of demand - hourly IFR 
scheduled demand does not exceed 10 aircraft per hour. 
Wellington airport stands out as having experienced the most significant growth in air 
traffic numbers. IFR aircraft movements increased some 10,000, or nearly 10% in 
1996, despite the restriction placed on operating hours. This growth has continued in 
1997, with a further 4,800 extra aircraft. 
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While some of this growth is directly attributable to increases in passenger numbers, 
the rate at which aircraft numbers has increased is greater. The Wellington 
International Airport Company Annual Report 1996 gives passenger growth at 50/0 
per annum, and forecasts this rate of growth to continue over the next fifteen years. 
Growth of aircraft numbers is well in excess of this. The answer lies in changes of 
aircraft types. Figure 7.9 below shows a comparison of the mix of aircraft types in 
1991 vs. 1997. 
Figure 7.9: Wellington IFR Traffic Mix 1991-1997 
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Most significant is a decrease in the number of 20-50 seat turboprop aircraft, from 
60% in 1991 to 28.60/0 in 1997. This has been in favour of a rise from 4% to 310/0 of 
the 6 - 18 seat light twin engine commuter aircraft. Clearly more frequent flights are 
being offered to consumers by smaller aircraft. This is almost certainly a result of 
deregulation, competition and the need to satisfy consumer demand for convenience, 
yet must surely be a major cause of the level of congestion now seen at Wellington 
airport. Figure 7.10 shows a current aircraft mix in greater detail. 
Figure 7.10: Wellington Traffic Mix 1997 
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A similar distribution is seen at Auckland airport. A full 24% of aircraft at Auckland 
fall into the 6-15 seat light aircraft category, with only 27% in the 20-50 seat 
turboprop class. 
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Figure 7.11: Auckland IFR Traffic Mix 1997 
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Change since 1991 at Auckland is similar to Wellington, with a greater number of 
light commuter aircraft, but at the expense of medium category jets, rather than 
turboprops. 
Figure 7.12: Auckland IFR Traffic Mix 1991-97 
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Christchurch airport is entirely different. This is partially due to geographical factors. 
Christchurch is, by comparison with Auckland and Wellington, isolated by distance 
from other centres. Closer towns are easily accessible by road, thus rendering short 
haul air transport infrequent. Resultantly, Christchurch has largely escaped the trend 
toward small aircraft on frequent services, as shown by its traffic mix. 
Figure 7.13: Christchurch IFR Traffic Mix 1997 
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At Christchurch, light commuter aircraft make up only 4 % of traffic while a full 41 % is 
20-35 seat turboprop category. Notable also is 450/0 of traffic is made up of Boeing 
737 and Bae 146 aircraft. The significance of this is that 700/0 of all traffic fall into the 
medium wake turbulence category. Further, 96% of these aircraft have a great 
similarity of performance capability. As well as avoiding congestion caused by 
frequent flights by small aeroplanes, continuity of aircraft size and performance 
assists airport capacity maximization. This is through both continuity and 
minimization of required separations between aircraft. 
Since 1991 it can be seen that some change has occurred, mostly an increase of 
turboprop aircraft in place of jets. While probably increasing frequency of flights with 
slightly smaller aircraft, this will not affect capacity as wake turbulence category and 
performance is largely similar. 
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Figure 7.14: Christchurch IFR Traffic Mix 1991-97 
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All three airports have experienced some movement to smaller aircraft types and 
greater frequency of flights. The greatest change by far has occurred at Wellington 
in terms of both size reduction and increased frequency. 
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Schedule Patterns 
AUCKLAND AIRPORT 
Scheduled demand at Auckland Airport is spread at a relatively even rate throughout 
the hours 0700 - 2100. Peaks in demand are seen in the morning period 0700 -
0900 and in the evening period 1800 - 1900. Typical daily demand by hourly rate is 
shown below. 
Figure 8.1: Auckland Traffic Schedule 
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This does not mean, however, that demand is evenly spread throughout each hour. 
Closer examination of daily traffic schedules reveals some periods where there may 
be several aircraft scheduled to either arrive or depart at the same time. As only one 
aircraft may use the runway at a given time, it follows that only one of these aircraft 
may operate at its scheduled moment - in effect, this is scheduled delay. Providing 
that this occurs only for short period, this scheduled delay will be of similar short 
duration. Figure 8.2 depicts peak period traffic at a ten minute rate. 
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Figure 8.2: Auckland Peak Period Scheduled Demand 
Again it can be seen that scheduled demand remains relatively constant. The ten-
minute period 0830 - 0840 stands out as one where many aircraft are scheduled for 
a short period of time, but because demand surrounding this time period is much 
lower it is likely that any delays resulting from this will be cleared quickly. 
CHRISTCHURCH AIRPORT 
Scheduled demand at Christchurch follows a regular, even demand pattern similar to 
Auckland. Demand is far lower, however, and peaks are not strongly evident. Figure 
8.3 shows typical scheduled demand at Christchurch. 
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Figure 8.3: Christchurch Traffic Schedule 
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Three periods - 0800-0900, 1400-1500 and 1800 - 1900 experience a slightly higher 
than normal demand. Figure 8.5 depicts these times as 1 0 minute intervals. Only 
the period 1810 -1820 shows any large 'bunching' of scheduled movements and it is 
followed by a ten minute interval with no scheduled movements. Consequently, 
scheduled delay is likely to result only for a short period. 
Fig u re 8.4: Chris tc h u rc h Pea k P e rio d S c he d u Ie dOe man d 
* Colour indicates non-continuous data only 
WELLINGTON AIRPORT 
The traffic schedule at Wellington shows demand at a similar rate to Auckland. Peak 
periods are also evident at a similar rate of demand, but for a longer duration - 0700-
0900 and 1600-1900. Because of the greater length of busy periods, it is likely that 
any scheduled delay will be in effect for a longer time - until an under utilised period 
occurs. 
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Figure 8.5: Wellington Scheduled Traffic 
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Examination of these peak periods indicates that scheduled delays at Wellington are 
likely to have ongoing effects, particularly during the evening peak. 
Figure 8.6: Wellington Peak Period Scheduled Demand 
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In all cases traffic schedules are not regular - they contain periods of high and low 
demand. This in itself may not be a necessarily be a cause of delay - unless those 
high demand periods exceed available capacity. Where more than one aircraft is 
scheduled for the same time, unavoidable delay must result, but this delay may not 
be large. In the case of Christchurch, scheduled demand does not exceed 20 
movements per hour. Despite periods of scheduled delay, following low demand 
periods enable this delay to be cleared quickly. 
Schedule patterns at Auckland and Wellington, conversely, contain many more 
periods of scheduled delay with fewer low demand periods. Any delay resulting from 
overlapping schedules will take longer to clear. In all cases, the definitive factor must 
be airport capacity. Where capacity is met or exceeded, any scheduled delay cannot 
be cleared until demand falls below available capacity. An investigation of airport 
capacity is therefore crucial to the determination of causes of delay. 
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Airport Capacity is a complex issue. There are many factors which combine to 
determine an airport's capacity. The most significant of these are: 
• Minimum separations between aircraft 
• The proportions of each wake turbulence category in the traffic mix using the 
airport 
• Aircraft performance mix 
• The ratio of arriving aircraft to departures 
• Weather conditions 
• Runway occupancy times 
• Runway size and geometry 
• Air Traffic Control procedures 
Capacity is affected to a great extent by all of these factors. It could be said that 
capacity is the result of the interactions between these factors, for capacity is dictated 
by time- the amount of time taken by each aircraft movement and the time which 
must be left between them. A more detailed explanation follows: 
Separation 
Separation refers to the distance - horizontal or vertical - which is required by CAA 
rules between aircraft in flight. In all cases, the rules of aviation require aircraft to be 
separated from each other - for the sound and quite obvious reason of collision 
avoidance. The way in which aircraft are required to be separated, however, is 
variable and dependant largely upon the conditions under which aircraft are flying. In 
the most simple case of VFR operations, aircraft are separated by visual means - in 
other words, by a pilot maintaining his own separation via sight. This is only 
possible, of course, when weather conditions are clear and is even then often 
unreliable when traffic density is high. For these reasons, the majority of air transport 
operations are conducted under Instrument Flight Rules. 
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Under this regime, separation between aircraft is provided by an Air Traffic 
Controller. This does not prevent pilots from maintaining visual separation, nor from 
making visual approaches at any airport if conditions permit. It does, however, 
facilitate aircraft operations in almost all conditions of weather. Exceptions may be 
extreme turbulence or fog. 
Most of New Zealand is covered by radar based control. As well as enabling 
controllers to handle a higher volume of traffic, the accuracy of this system allows 
controllers to separate aircraft by distance. Non-radar separations must be time 
based. The minimum radar separation allowed between aircraft enroute is five 
nautical miles. This is reduced to three nautical miles within the terminal airspace 
surrounding Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Ohakea airports. These are the 
minimum allowable lateral separations which must never be infringed (negated if 
vertical separation of 1000 feet is attained). 
Smaller separations between aircraft, especially on final approach raises the capacity 
of an airport. Obviously, if successive movements may take place in the time taken 
to fly three miles, a greater number of movements can occur than if, say five miles 
were required. 
Wake Turbulence Separation 
"Wake turbulence is the term used to describe the effects of the rotating air masses 
(wake vortices) generated behind the wing tips of aircraft in flight. These vortices are 
two counter-rotating cylindrical air masses trailing aft from the aircraft and are 
particularly severe when generated by large and wide bodied aircraft. The vortices 
are most dangerous to following aircraft during the take-off, initial climb, final 
approach and landing phases of flight. They tend to drift down, and when close to 
the ground move sideways from the track of the generating aircraft." (Instrument 
Flight Guide, ACNZ) 
Wake turbulence separation is provided by Air Traffic Control to all aircraft in the 
approach or departure phases of flight, except in the case of an IFR aircraft making a 
visual approach or VFR arrivals. 
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Aircraft are divided into the following categories for the purpose of assessing required 
wake turbulence separation: 
Heavy 
All aircraft types of 136,000 kg or more maximum weight (includes 8767, 8747, 
MD11) 
Medium 
Aircraft types of less than 136,000 kg but more than 7,000 maximum weight (includes 
8737, 8727,8A46,ATR,SF34) 
Light 
Aircraft types of less than 7,000 kg maximum weight (includes SW3, E11 0, PA31) 
The following table provides the minimum radar wake turbulence separation for 
aircraft in the arrival or departure phases of flight: 
LEADING AIRCRAFT AIRCRAFT CROSSING OR MINIMUM DISTANCE 
FOLLOWING BEHIND 
HEAVY HEAVY 4NM 
MEDUIM SNM 
LIGHT 6NM 
MEDIUM HEAVY 3NM 
MEDUIM 3NM 
LIGHT SNM 
LIGHT HEAVY 3NM 
MEDUIM 3NM 
LIGHT 3NM 
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The only exception to this is light category aircraft following medium category aircraft 
below 25,000 kg maximum weight. In this case, wake turbulence separation may be 
reduced from 5 NM to 3 NM. 
Practically, this means that light category aeroplanes such as the SW3 Metroliner or 
E110 Bandierante may follow 3 NM (rather than 5) behind ATR 72, DH8 or SF34 
aircraft, but must be separated by five miles when following a B737 or BA46. 
Tower wake turbulence separation is as follows: 
Between Arriving Flights 
LEADING AIRCRAFT FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT MINIMUM TIME 
HEAVY MEDIUM 2 MIN 
LIGHT 3 MIN 
MEDIUM LIGHT 3 MIN 
Between Departing Flights 
LEADING AIRCRAFT FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT DEPARTING FROM DEPARTING FROM 
SAME TAKE OFF INTERMEDIATE 
POSITION POSITION 
HEAVY MEDIUM 2 MIN 3 MIN 
LIGHT 2 MIN 3 MIN 
MEDIUM LIGHT 2 MIN 3 MIN 
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Between Arriving and Departing Flights 
LEADING AIRCRAFT FOLLOWING AIRCRAFT MINIMUM SPACING AT 
TIME AIRCRAFT ARE 
AIRBORNE OR HAVE 
TOUCHED DOWN 
HEA VY ARRIVAL MEDIUM DEPARTURE 2 MIN 
LIGHT DEPARTURE 2 MIN 
MEDIUM ARRIVAL LIGHT DEPARTURE 2 MIN 
HEAVY DEPARTURE MEDIUM ARRIVAL 2 MIN 
LIGHT ARRlV AL 2 MIN 
MEDIUM DEPARTURE LIGHT ARRIVAL 2 MIN 
It is clear what effect wake turbulence separation can have upon capacity when there 
is a large diversity of aircraft types using an airport. For example, minimum 
separation will be 3 NM for any medium category aircraft following a Boeing 737 or 
Bae 146 aircraft - the same as minimum radar separation; but if the following aircraft 
is light then wake turbulence requirements dictate a larger five mile separation. 
Similarly, the required separation behind all heavy aircraft is larger than 3 NM. 
Capacity is greatest when all aircraft types fall into the same wake turbulence 
category, other than heavy. 
Aircraft Performance Mix 
Aircraft performance affects capacity through the need to take account of differing 
speeds and rates of climb amongst the aircraft type mix. Where performance of 
aircraft is similar, performance may be standardised. For example, if a Boeing 737 
follows a Bae 146 or ATR 72 on approach, speed and descent rates can be dictated 
by Air Traffic Control and, consequently, minimum separation is easily achieved. 
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With great disparity in performance, however, the situation becomes more complex. 
A B737 will usually fly an approach at a speed between 170 and 200 Knots - a light 
twin usually around 140 Knots. If a fast aircraft follows a slow one, it is unlikely to be 
able to reduce its speed to that of the slower. An air traffic controller must therefore 
employ a larger gap than the minimum 3 NM so that this is not infringed as the 
leading aircraft approaches landing. Worse may be the situation of a slow aircraft 
following a fast one. In this scenario an initial three mile separation will continually 
widen as the slower aircraft cannot attain the speed of the faster. 
A similar situation may arise with departures, especially under instrument conditions. 
If a fast aircraft is taking off behind a slower one, a greater time period may have to 
be used than that required by either radar or wake turbulence separations to avoid 
'catch up' by the better performing type. In all cases, where performance is similar 
minimum separations may be used - this is not necessarily the case where 
differentials exist. 
Air Traffic Controllers will attempt to minimise this effect by turning slow aircraft from 
the departure track at the earliest opportunity. Nevertheless, the time taken for a 
B737 departure, followed by a SF34, followed by a E110 is 4 min 15 sec. If the 
departure order were reversed, the time taken would be 6 min. 30 sec. 
While efficient sequencing by air traffic control may combat the problem to some 
extent, in reality if a wide diversity of aircraft performance exists then capacity will be 
reduced. 
Arrival/Departure Ratio 
Not all aircraft movements take the same amount of time. It takes longer for an 
aircraft to fly an approach, land and vacate the runway than it does to line-up and 
take off. This is especially true in instrument conditions when aircraft fly a full10 mile 
approach to land. Under these conditions, wake turbulence separations and 
performance differentials take their full effect. Capacity is greatest when arrivals only 
sequences are avoided - that is, when each arriving aircraft is interspersed with a 
departure. Not only does this minimise the effect of performance differentials,but it 
is a sequence for which accuracy is most sustainable. 
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Weather Conditions 
Weather conditions are the single biggest determinant of airport capacity. Separation 
and air traffic control procedures are both dictated primarily by weather conditions. 
When conditions are visual, aircraft rarely fly a full 10 NM approach to landing. 
Rather, a final approach 2 - 5 NM is elected as pilots are able to navigate and 
descend by visual means. Speed differentials become less significant in this 
situation, as aircraft follow directly behind each other for only a short time. 
Additionally, wake turbulence separation is not required to be provided by air traffic 
control when an aircraft is flying a visual approach - rather the pilot is responsible for 
maintaining adequate separation. This may be less than theseparation which would 
be provided under instrument conditions. Finally, departing aircraft are often 
(although not always) able to be turned from the departure track at an earlier time. 
This allows performance related delay between successive departures to be 
reduced. Airport Capacity is greatest under visual conditions. 
When instrument conditions exist - that is, when low cloud base and I or poor 
visibility exists to prevent pilots from navigating by visual means - all separations 
must be provided by air traffic control. Under these conditions, a full 10 NM final 
approach is flown by most aircraft and the factors of aircraft performance differentials 
and wake turbulence separation have their fullest effect. 
Strong winds and turbulence also affect capacity. Where winds are strong and gusty, 
extra caution is required from pilots and air traffic controllers alike. Extra horizontal 
separation may be necessary if gusty conditions accelerate 'catch-up' between 
aircraft. Similarly, turbulence may necessitate an increase in vertical separations if 
aircraft experience difficulty in attaining or maintaining height. 
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Runway Occupancy 
Runway occupancy time affects capacity because one aircraft must be clear of the 
runway before another aircraft can use it. Excessive runway occupancy has a 
surprisingly large effect on capacity. For example, a runway capacity of 36 
movements per hour translates to one movement every 1 minute, 40 seconds. A 
saving of 5 seconds per aircraft would increase capacity by one movement per hour. 
In order to achieve minimum separations between aircraft, air traffic controllers must 
be able to accurately predict the amount of time each aircraft will occupy the runway. 
For this reason, it is important that occupancy times be consistent as well as minimal. 
A survey of some 1700 aircraft movements at Auckland and Wellington airports 
shows that 55.6% of aircraft take longer than 10 seconds to respond to take-off 
clearance, and 15% take longer than 20 seconds. 
Runway Geometry 
Runway geometry affects capacity in two ways. For arrivals, geometry relates to 
runway occupancy time through runway exits. Arriving aircraft must slow to aspeed 
which allows them to turn prior to exiting the runway. Exit speed is related to the 
angle through which aircraft must turn - that is, a 30° degree turn may be executed 
at a faster speed than a larger turn. If runway exits are situated at a 90° angle to the 
runway, then aircraft must slow to a much greater extent prior to exiting. The 
taxiways at Auckland airport are situated so as to allow rapid exit, Wellington and 
Christchurch do not have this facility and require much sharper turns. 
For departing aircraft, geometry also affects runway occupancy time but through 
availability of holding areas where aircraft can complete their pre take off checks. 
This helps to ensure that aircraft entering the runway are ready to commence take off 
immediately when instructed. Holding areas allow aircraft to pass one another, thus 
allow air traffic control to select the most efficient departure order, rather than 'first 
come, first served'. As explained earlier, the order in which aircraft depart can have 
large effects on capacity. New Zealand airports make little provision of holding bays, 
although Auckland and Christchurch airports circumvent this to a large extent by 
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virtue of their size. Few aircraft use the full length of the runway so can be lined up 
at varying points. Wellington does not have this lUxury - a shorter runway, most 
aircraft use full length. In the absence of holding areas, aircraft can not normally be 
re-ordered and so departure order is largely determined by order of arrival at the 
holding point, even when a queue exists. 
Calculation of Capacity 
Capacity at any airport is the result of the interaction of all of the above factors. It is 
necessary, therefore, for any capacity model to incorporate these. Capacity for the 
purposes of this research draw upon capacity models developed by this author for 
the Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd, and released as the Wellington Air 
Traffic Management Study (1997) and Auckland Capacity Study (1997). 
The methodology for development of these models is as follows. First aircraft 
performance by individual type was observed and recorded at fifteen second 
intervals, incorporating distance and height information (on arrival and departure). 
Runway occupancy times were recorded for each type, and at both airports. This 
information shows the time taken by each type of aircraft to fly an approach, land and 
vacate the runway, or alternatively to line up and take off. When incorporated with 
the appropriate separations and approach path, capacity is ascertained. 
These models have been used to provide capacity statements for both Auckland and 
Wellington airports under varying weather conditions, and for arrival only, departure 
only, and 1 arrival! 1 departure sequence scenarios. These are general statements 
of capacity which incorporate normal aircraft type mix. 
These models provide an explicit statement of the maximum possible number of 
aircraft movements which can be accommodated in a given time. They can be used 
to provide a general case, or to model a specific scenario with equal accuracy. 
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WELLINGTON AIRPORT 
Capacity at Wellington airport is the most complex and variable. Three main 
discernible weather states exist at Wellington, for which capacity levels are distinct. 
This is because of differing separations which must be employed during the differing 
weather conditions. 
When visual conditions exist at Wellington - that is, when the weather permits all 
aircraft to navigate by visual reference and to maintain their own separation from 
other aircraft - then the only separation requirement is tower wake turbulence. The 
time taken between aircraft is at its minimum, thus capacity is greatest. 
Instrument conditions at Wellington fall into two broad categories - above circling 
minima, and below circling minima. All airports define a minimum visibility and height 
of cloud base under which aircraft may circle visually for a second approach to land if 
the first attempt is missed. These levels are defined in Table 2 below: 
Table 2: 
Circling Minima - ILS Approach 
AIRCRAFT CATEGORY AUCKLAND WELLINGTON CHRISTCHURCH 
A 470' (447,) 1900m 1000' (958') 5000m 670' (547,) 1900m 
B 550' (527,) 2800m 1000' (958') 5000m 670' (547,) 2800m 
C 770' (747') 3700m 1500' (1458,) 5000m 800' (677') 3700m 
D 910' (887') 4600m NA 840' (717,) 4600m 
The heights in this table refer to cloud base above mean sea level, the figure in 
brackets is cloud base above the ground - the third figure is visibility. Aircraft 
categories include the following: 
Category A 
8 
All singles, light twins, E110 
SW3, SF34, ATR, DH8 
C 8737, 8A46, 8767 
D 8747, MD11, DC10 
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It can be seen that the circling minima for Wellington is greater than for other airports. 
This is largely due to the terrain which surrounds Wellington airport - by contrast, 
Christchurch and Auckland are relatively flat. This is important to airport capacity for 
two reasons: 
The height at which aircraft are unable to circle visually for a second attempt at 
landing should they miss on the first attempt is much higher. If an aircraft cannot 
circle visually, then it must return to radar based control (rather than tower) and the 
larger separations this entails. 
More importantly, if an aircraft misses its landing at Wellington, it cannot be turned 
from the missed approach path until terrain clearance has been achieved. At 
Auckland or Christchurch airports, terrain is flat which allows aircraft to be turned 
early - this is not possible at Wellington. 
The result of this is that the missed approach must be 'protected' for all arrivals at 
Wellington when weather conditions are below circling minima. In other words, much 
larger separations are required between arriving flights to ensure safe separation in 
the event of a missed approach. It is this which creates a third main weather 
category, and hence capacity level for Wellington airport. 
The theoretical maximum capacity at Wellington airport is as follows: 
Wellington Airport Capacity 
Arrivals Departures 1 Arr. /1 Dep. 
Visual Conditions 31 35 43 
Instrument Conditions 
Above Circling Minima 28 31 38 
Instrument Conditions 
Below Circling Minima 21 30 32/33 
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What is most immediately significant about this is the level to which capacity is 
reduced during below circling conditions. During a 1 arrival / 1 departure sequence, 
capacity is always at its highest - during below circling minima conditions, however, 
this represents only 76% of capacity during visual conditions and 84% of instrument 
above circling minima capacity. 
If the aircraft movements are 'bunched' - that is several arrivals followed by several 
departures, then capacity is reduced even further. As shown by aircraft schedules, 
demand during all peak periods exceeds this level of capacity. The outcome of this 
is unavoidably delay. 
The requirement to protect the missed approach in this manner stems directly from 
differences in aircraft performance capabilities. If a high performance aircraft follows 
a poor performing one (in terms of speed and climb capability), then safe separation 
cannot be guaranteed by normal separation in the event of a missed approach. The 
faster aircraft will quickly catch up to the slower. This is equally applicable to a fast 
arrival following a slow arrival or departure. At Auckland or Christchurch, the slower 
aircraft would simply be turned under radar direction. For this reason, (unless 
landing or take-off minima is infringed) capacity is not significantly affected by below 
circling conditions. 
This is the most serious effect of the variation of aircraft type mix at Wellington. If all 
aircraft using the airport were of similar performance characteristics then there would 
be little or no 'catch up' factor to contend with. In other words, the requirement to 
protect the missed approach would be removed. This, in turn, would eliminate the 
need for larger separations in below circling minima conditions. The final result - no 
reduction in airport capacity during below circling minima conditions. 
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AUCKLAND AIRPORT 
The theoretical maximum capacity of Auckland airport is as follows: 
Auckland Airport Capacity 
Arrivals Departures 1 Arr. /1 Dep. 
Visual Conditions 
Runway 23 34 36 40 
Runway 05 32 36 39 
Instrument Conditions 
Runway 23 28 36 37 
Runway 05 26 36 36 
The differential between the two runways is due to a combination of runway 
geometry and to airspace avoidance requirements. 
Airport layout at Auckland, specifically the siting of the runway exits causes longer 
runway occupancy times for the 05 vector than for its opposite 23. Additionally, 
aircraft which require the use of full runway length on take-off have to back-track to 
line up on runway 05. The additional time taken on the runway has a degrading 
effect on capacity. 
As well as this, air traffic control procedures require that aircraft on departure from 
Runway 05 climb to sufficient height to avoid the Ardmore Training Area prior to 
commencing a right turn. Almost all aircraft departing Auckland are heading south, 
so this restriction affects most aircraft, particularly unpressurised aeroplaneswhich 
cannot maintain a steep rate of climb. In consequence, a differential is seen between 
the two runway vectors. 
Capacity at Auckland airport is not affected by below circling minima conditions. As 
well as much lower minima, the relatively flat terrain surrounding the airport does not 
require the same protection of the missed approach as demanded at Wellington. 
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Consequently, the large reduction of capacity in below circling minima conditions 
experienced at Wellington does not occur at Auckland. 
Capacity at Auckland is lower than Wellington. This may be due to differences in 
aircraft type mix. There is a much greater number of heavy aircraft at Auckland than 
Wellington, and the larger wake turbulence separation required by these aircraft is 
likely to adversely affect runway capacity. This is not the only difference between 
these two airports, however. Air traffic control procedures differ also. 
At Auckland, a system of tower initiated departures (TIDs) is used. In basic terms 
this means that the arrivals radar controller at Auckland will position aircraft on 
approach with a set gap between them to allow a departure to take place. Tower 
controllers can therefore launch departing aircraft with no specific co-ordination with 
or requests for gaps from radar control. 
At Wellington and Christchurch, conversely, gaps between arrivals are set according 
to the minimum separation required and increased for departures only on specific 
request from tower controllers. 
In all cases, the capacity shown here is the theoretical maximum for that airport and 
weather condition. It incorporates aircraft performance, runway occupancy times, 
wind, separation and air traffic control procedures. There is no allowance, however, 
for variation of human performance or for weather conditions such as turbulence. 
Human performance - of both pilots and controllers - is thefactor which determines 
how close to theoretical maximum capacity achieved throughput will be. 
As well as this, scheduled traffic does not follow a strict 1 arrival 11 departure 
sequence. Although this sequence of traffic movement generally yields the highest 
capacity and is also the most sustainable in terms of accuracy, actual traffic patterns 
rarely follow this pattern. Rather, traffic in New Zealand tends to be 'bunched'in 
groups of arrivals followed by groups of departures. 
Both the Wellington Air Traffic Management Study and Auckland Capacity Study take 
account of this with the development of 'realistic' capacity levels. These capacity 
statements are the 'declared' capacity of Wellington and Auckland airports and are 
the average achieved throughput over periods where capacity is known to be 
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reached. By this method, variation of weather conditions, variations of human 
performance and aircraft movement patterns are embodied. 
Auckland 
Runway 05 
Runway 23 
Wellington 
Auckland / Wellington Realistic Capacity levels 
Visual 
37 
38 
38 
Instrument 
34 
35 
36 
CHRISTCHURCH AIRPORT 
Instrument 
Below Circling 
NIA 
NIA 
28 
Delay measured at Christchurch is minimal and is clearly not the result of congestion. 
Examination of scheduled traffic confirms that demand is well below a level which 
could result in delay, other than that caused by schedules or runway closure. 
Because Christchurch is a multi-runway airport, its maximum capacity will be higher 
than either Auckland or Wellington, but will also be more variable and dependant 
upon weather conditions, especially wind strength and direction. 
At best, both the main (02/20) and cross (11/29) runways will be available for use-
at worst, only the cross vector. This is dictated in the main by wind, but is also by 
cloud. No instrument approach aid is available for runway 11 or 29. It is thus 
necessary for aircraft making an instrument approach for either of these runways to 
descend on the runway 02 or 20 approach to a point where they may circle by visual 
reference to land on 11 or 29. 
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Capacity at Christchurch is thus potentially a highly variable measure. In reality, the 
situation does not entail the risks suggested above. The weatherconditions which 
dictate the sole use of runway 11 or 29 will include strong easterly or westerly winds 
- this is not normally consistent with low level cloud. It is therefore extremely unlikely 
that runway closure would ever result from the lack of an approach aid for runways 
11 and 29. 
Examination of aircraft schedules at Christchurch reveals a level of demand well 
below that experienced at Auckland and Wellington airports - approximately 30% 
lower. Yet capacity at this airport will be approximately equal to Auckland and 
Wellington in the case of one useable runway, and significantly higher if two runways 
are useable. Not surprisingly, the level of delay recorded at Christchurch is very 
small. This is not attributable to congestion, but rather to limitations of data recording 
and to any unavoidable delay in aircraft schedules - that is, any periods where more 
than one aircraft is scheduled for the same time. 
It is equally clear that Christchurch airport can sustain a high level of growth prior to 
facing issues of capacity and congestion. For this reason, it is not considered 
necessary in this research to develop a modelling technique to determine multi-
runway airport capacity. 
Capacity at Christchurch airport has been calculated here using the same modelling 
technique as for Auckland and Wellington airports. This is a single runway (02/20) 
capacity, and its purpose is to provide a comparison for Auckland and Wellington 
airports, rather than as a true indication of the capacity of Christchurch airport. 
Christchurch Airport Single Runway Capacity 
Arrivals 
Visual Conditions 36 
Instrument Conditions 31 
Departures 
44 
44 
1 Arr. /1 Dep. 
43 
42 
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Capacity at Christchurch is higher than at either Auckland or Wellington, most 
significantly in the instrument conditions case. This is most likely to be due to the 
similarity of aircraft in the type mix using Christchurch airport. As shown earlier, 70% 
of the aircraft using Christchurch airport are medium wake turbulence category 
aircraft. Just as significant as consistent weight category is aircraft performance 
capability. Of the remaining aircraft, 4% are other medium category aircraft,16% are 
SW3 Metroliners, and 6% are heavy jets. The Metroliner, while being a light category 
aircraft, has the performance capability of a much larger aircraft. It is a light 
commuter which is built to perform amongst jets. 
Resultantly, 96% of the scheduled traffic using Christchurch airport are able to 
perform to a high and consistent standard. This avoids the difficulty of performance 
differentials seen at Auckland and Wellington airports, and is likely to be the major 
reason for the higher capacity levels at Christchurch airport. 
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Aircraft Type Mix 
In order to determine the extent to which aircraft type mix affects capacity, the 
Auckland and Wellington capacity models have been executed with the aircraft type 
mix using Christchurch airport. The table below shows the result of this: 
Auckland / Wellington Capacity - Christchurch Aircraft Type Mix 
Instrument Conditions 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Arrivals 
31 (+3) 
31 (+3) 
Departures 
44 (+8) 
42 (+11) 
1 Arr. / 1 Dep. 
39(+2) 
40(+2) 
It can be seen from this that capacity can be increased for both Auckland and 
Wellington by improving the aircraft type mix. This is particularly significant for 
Wellington airport which presently includes a high number of light category, low 
performance aircraft in its type mix. As well as increasing overall capacity, 
consistency of aircraft performance greatly removes the requirement for large 
separations in order to protect the missed approach. The benefits of improving type 
mix for Wellington are thus two-fold. 
A note of caution though - increasing the number of heavy aircraft in the type mix at 
Wellington will reduce, rather than raise capacity. This is true to some extent at all 
airports - wake turbulence separation is larger behind heavy aircraft than any other, 
but at Wellington there is an additional problem during instrument conditions. The 
siting of the localiser portion of the ILS approach aid means that its signal is distorted 
by any aircraft the size of (or larger than) a Friendship which exits the runway by the 
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last taxiway. Most aircraft exit at a much earlier point - except for heavy types which 
use full runway length on landing. The result of this is that a 12 mile separation is 
required behind all heavy aircraft during all instrument conditions to ensure an 
accurate signal for following aircraft. 
Despite the increase made by improved aircraft type mix, capacity at Auckland does 
not reach the level of Wellington or Christchurch. In the absence of any other factor, 
it is concluded that this differential is due to air traffic control procedures. The use of 
TIDs and its larger gaps between arriving aircraft, while possibly easing air traffic 
controller workload through reduced co-ordination between tower and radar 
controllers, has a detrimental effect on airport capacity. Capacity at Auckland could 
be enhanced by both aircraft type mix changes, and by air traffic control procedure 
changes. 
It can be seen, then that aircraft type mix improvements could add an additional 2 
movements per hour to both Auckland and Wellington runway capacities. This is for 
the 1 arrival I 1 departure sequence. Larger increases are evident for the arrivals 
only and departures only scenarios, but overall capacity is lower if these movement 
sequences are employed. Note that an approximately even number of arrivals and 
departures occur. 
Movement Type Mix 
Airline schedules do not follow this regime, however. Movements at all New Zealand 
airports tend to be bunched in groups of arrivals followed by groups of departures. 
Especially in the case of Wellington airport, this is a necessary industry response to 
demand. Traffic at Wellington is largely business orientated - hence the peak 
demand periods at the beginning and end of each day. This necessitates movement 
type bunching and is unlikely to alter. Aircraft movements are significantly bunched 
into groups of arrivals and departures - especially during the morning peak demand 
period at Wellington and at several times during the day at Auckland. Capacity 
cannot be maximized with this distribution. 
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Schedule Delay 
The causes of delay identified so far all deal with capacity maximisation - or the lack 
of it. Airport congestion, however, is due to excess demand. This can take two 
forms. In the first case, congestion can be due to schedule delay - the scheduling of 
multiple aircraft movements for the same time. This type of delay is common in New 
Zealand - there is no method of management or control on aircraft flight planning. 
Delays due to schedules are unlikely to be severe, nor are they likely to have 
ongoing effects for any significant period of time. As shown earlier, schedules at 
Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch contain numerous periods where demand is 
high for short periods. 
At Christchurch, this is a minor problem which results in very little delay. At Auckland 
and Wellington, the problem is more widespread. Aircraft planned movements are 
often concentrated on the hour and half hour. Where this is followed by low demand 
periods, delay is quickly dissipated. If no low demand periods occur immediately 
following this, however, then delay cannot be dispersed. The period 0830 - 0900 is 
a particular problem for both these airports. Auckland has 3 - 4 movements 
scheduled for 0830, followed by 7 at 0835. This cannot occur, so delay is created 
and cleared only when periods of low demand occur. At Wellington the problem is 
worse. 4 aircraft are regularly scheduled for 0820, 4 more for 0825 and 7 at 0830. 
There can be no other outcome from this but delay. Scheduled delay in the 
afternoon period occurs for the same reasons but it is longer before low demand 
periods occur to allow delay dispersal. Figures 10.1 and 10.2 below show scheduled 
delay at Auckland and Wellington airports. 
Figure 10.6: Wellington Schedule Excess Demand Delay 
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Figure 10.2: Wellington Schedule Delay 
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The second form of congestion is due to excess demand. The potential for ongoing 
delay is much higher in this case. In reality, schedule and congestion delay are 
symptoms of the same problem - excess demand over available capacity. The only 
difference between them is the extent of the problem and resulting delays. 
Schedule delay cannot be considered as true congestion, however. While the 
scheduling of multiple aircraft movements for the same period of time results in 
delay, these delays are quickly dispersed in periods of low demand. For example, if 
6 aircraft are scheduled at say, 1300 then 5 of them must incur some delay. It is 
possible for only one of these aircraft to utilise the runway at 1300. There may, 
however, be no further movements scheduled for 10 or 15 minutes. Indeed, capacity 
over the period 1300-1330 or 1300-1400 may be well in excess of demand. This 
type of delay cannot be considered as true congestion. 
Congestion must be considered to occur when demand exceeds the available 
capacity of an airport for significant periods of time. In this situation, delays are 
unable to be dispersed until demand lowers also for a significant period of time. 
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Excess Demand 
Demand and capacity for Auckland and Wellington airports has been identified. The 
extent to which delays are due to excess demand - airport congestion - may be 
established through a comparison of these two measures. Figure 10.3 shows 
scheduled demand at Auckland at half-hourly intervals and overlaid with theairport's 
'declared' (realistic) capacity for that period. 
Figure 10.3: Auckland Scheduled Traffic and Capacity 
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Visual Capacity - Instrument Capacity 
Auckland capacity is well in excess of the level of demand during both visual and 
instrument conditions. There is only one period at 1800 where demand exceeds 
available capacity. Figure 10.4 shows excess demand at Auckland, and the level of 
delay which is attributable to this. 
Figure 10.4: Auckland Schedule Excess Demand Delay 
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Wellington airport experiences a higher level of delay than Auckland, a fact 
attributable to fluctuating capacity and to schedule distribution. Figure 10.5 depicts 
scheduled demand and capacity at Wellington. 
Figure 10.5: Wellington Scheduled Traffic and Capacity 
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Visual Capacity - Instrument Capacity - Below Circling Capacity 
Demand exceeds capacity at Wellington on a regular basis. While this excess 
demand is very small, and hence easy to clear on visual days, the situation is worse 
during instrument conditions. Figure 10.6 shows excess demand and congestion 
delay at Wellington. 
Figure 10.6: Wellington Schedule Excess Demand Delay 
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While a small amount of congestion delay can be seen during instrument conditions 
above circling, the level of delay during below circling minima conditions is well in 
excess of this. Delay levels exceed 20 minutes and the period of congestion is two 
hours in the morning, broadening to four hours in the afternoon and evening. 
The two types of delay shown here, schedule and congestion delay, may not be 
cumulative. If an aircraft is delayed through congestion due to excess demand, then 
it will not necessarily arrive for its next service at the appointed time. This deviation 
from scheduled time is likely to continue throughput the course of the day. This 
applies equally to any reason for delay - from congestion to late passengers and 
engineering difficulties. In other words, the fact that an aircraft is scheduled for a 
specific time does not guarantee that it will present itself for service at that time; and 
this mayor may not be due to schedule or congestion delay. 
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Air transport traffic levels in New Zealand have experienced consistent growth over 
recent years. This trend is expected to continue for at least the next fifteen years. 
Wellington International Airport Ltd estimates Wellington traffic growth at 5% per 
annum with passenger numbers climbing from 3.2 million in 1996 to reach 6 million 
by 2011 (Wellington International Airport Ltd. Annual Report 1996). 
Air traffic growth and constraints in the Asia / Pacific region (including New Zealand) 
are estimated in a report entitled 'Asia/Pacific Air Traffic - Growth and Constraints' 
produced by the Air Transport Action Group (ATAG) and published by the 
International Air Transport Association (lATA) Aviation Information and Research 
Department. 
ATAG describes itself as "an independent coalition of organisations from throughout 
the air transport industry which have united to press for economically beneficial 
aviation capacity improvements in an environmentally responsible manner. ATAG is 
a leading proponent of aviation infrastructure issues including the economic benefits 
of air transport, the industry's superior environmental performance and the need for 
major improvements in airport and air traffic management capacity." 
In this report, domestic passenger numbers within New Zealand are shown to have 
increased from 2.7 million in 1985 to 4 million in 1995 a rise of 48%. Similarly, 
international passenger traffic has grown 109% from 2.2 million to 4.6 million. 
Growth between 1995 and 2010 is forecast as 105% domestic passenger growth to 
8.6 million in 2010 and 137% international passenger growth to 10.9 million. 
The average annual rate of growth for the period 1985-1995 is 5.7%. The 
forecasted average annual rate of growth 1995-2010 is 5.4%. At the major 
international as well as domestic New Zealand ports, this level of forecasted growth 
has significant ramifications particularly for Wellington and Auckland airports. 
Traffic growth at the rate of 5.4% per annum 1997 - 2005 has been simulated here in 
order to provide an indication of the level of future congestion and delay which would 
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be created by this levels of growth. This simulation assumes no change to aircraft 
type mix or schedule distribution. Figure 11.1 depicts Auckland forecast demand and 
capacity' 1997 - 2005. 
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Figure 11.1: Auckland Scheduled Traffic 1997 - 2005 
Forecast Growth @ 5.4% per annum 
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Visual Capacity - Instrument Capacity 
It can be seen that capacity is exceeded during instrument conditions for several 
periods by 2000, and during visual conditions by 2005. Excess demand and level of 
delay is shown by figures 11.2 - 11.4. 
Figure 11.2: Auckland Schedule Excess Demand 1997 
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Figure 11.3: Auckland Schedule Excess Demand 2000 
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Figure 11.4: Auckland Schedule Excess Demand 2005 
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The level of delay due to congestion will rise from four minutes for onehalf hour 
period during instrument conditions to double this by 2000. Delay due to congestion 
is also seen during visual conditions - albeit briefly. Congestion delay will not reach 
significant levels until 2005 where congested periods are up to 2 hours long with 
delay levels around 30 minutes. 
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At Wellington airport, predictably the situation is more serious. During some weather 
conditions, the level of congestion related delay already exceeds that forecasted for 
Auckland in 2005. Figure 11.5 shows Wellington demand and capacity 1997 - 2005. 
Figure 11.5 : Wellington Scheduled Traffic 1997 ·2005 
Forec a st @ 5.4% per annum 
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Visual Capacity - Instrument Capacity - Below Circling Capacity 
Capacity is exceeded at 1997 levels during instrument below circling conditions, 
resulting in congestion delay for periods of 1- 2 hours in the morning and 2 - 3 hours 
in the evening. As well as worsening of this condition, congestion can be seen to 
reach the instrument above circling and visual conditions by 2000 - a situation which 
would see the level of delay presently experienced only during below circling 
conditions a reality for all conditions. Figures 11.6 - 11.8 depict the level of excess 
demand and congestion delay this level of growth would incur at Wellington. 
Figure 11.6: Wellington Excess Demand Delay 1997 
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By 2000, delays during visual and instrument conditions above circling minima will 
reach the levels presently experienced during instrument below circling minima 
conditions. The congested period will be two hours long in the morning and 
approximately 1 hour in the evening. During below circling conditions, delay will be 
as high as 80 minutes, the congested period 13.5 hours. 
Figure 11.7: Wellington Excess Demand Delay 2000 
90 
80 
>-
.:! 70 
! 
~ 60 
~ 50 i 40 :I 
U 
I 30 
I: 20 i 
10 
CVISUAL .INSTRUMENT . BELOW CIRCLING 
By 2005, congestion is continuous with delays exceeding 1 hour even during visual 
conditions. During below circling conditions, delays exceed 2 hours by 0830, rising 
to nearly 6 hours. Nearly 3 hours delay remains at curfew. 
Figure 11.8: Wellington Excess Demand Delay 2005 
400 
350 
f 
300 
i 250 
E 200 
E 
d 
I 150 
:i 100 
50 
CVISUAL .INSTRUMENT . BELOW CIRCLING 
90 
Growth at Christchurch is largely unrestricted. Figure 11.9 shows scheduled traffic 
growth at 5.40/0 1997 - 2005. 
Figure 11.8: Christchurch Scheduled Traffic 1997 - 2005 Forecast Growth @ 
5.4% per annum 
1_ 1997 _2000 02005 1 
By 2005 Peak traffic has not yet reached 30 movements per hour. This is insufficient 
demand to cause congestion. It will be a further 10 years (approximately) at this rate 
of growth before congestion becomes a major problem for Christchurch airport. 
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Airborne Delays 
The level of delay at New Zealand's major airports is generally low. At Christchurch, 
delays average approximately three minutes, with little or no variation between visual 
and instrument conditions. At Auckland, delays similarly average 3 minutes during 
visual conditions, rising to 4 minutes when instrument conditions exist. 
At Wellington airport, the level of delay varies considerably with weather conditions. 
During visual conditions, average delay is low - approximately three minutes. This 
rises slightly to an average of five minutes during instrument conditions, and steeply 
to an average of eleven minutes during conditions which are below circling minima. 
Peak delays during below circling minima conditions may exceed 1 hour in duration. 
The annual cost of delays at New Zealand's major airports has been estimated in 
terms of total minutes of delay, and estimated aircraft fuel burn in delay. 
Wellington 
Auckland 
Christchurch 
Minutes Annual Delay Annual Fuel Cost (Kg fuel) 
291,650 
248,374 
138,849 
4,451,257 
7,101,456 
3,821 ,924 
Total minutes of delay at Wellington are higher than either Auckland or Christchurch. 
Notably, Auckland accommodates 11,988 more IFR aircraft movements per year 
than Wellington and does so for a cost of 43,276 minutes less. Recorded delay at all 
three airports is similar (3 - 5 minutes average) and within the limitations of data 
recording, with the exception of periods during below circling minima conditions at 
Wellington. 
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These conditions occurs 11 % of the time at Wellington, yet is responsible for 24% of 
recorded delays. These are real-time delays, not the product of flight plan or data 
recording limitations. The cost of delays during these conditions is some 69,996 
minutes annually and approximately 1,068,302 Kg of fuel. A single day below cirCling 
minima will cost the industry some 1,750 minutes (29 hours) of airbornedelay, and 
approximately 26,708 Kg of aircraft fuel. 
These delays have ongoing effects through both schedule and network disruption. 
Delays incurred by one aircraft may affect other aircraft if passengers are transferring 
from one flight to another. Additionally, any delay incurred by an aircraft will be 
carried on to its next destination - continuously, until sufficient time is saved either in 
the air or in ground turn-arounds to enable the time lost in delay to be recouped. To 
recoup 29 hours of delay across scheduled traffic is a feat any airline would find 
difficult to achieve. 
Weather Conditions 
Weather conditions also affect average runway throughput. At Auckland airport, 
average runway utilisation is 37 minutes per hour during visual conditions, 35 during 
instrument conditions. Wellington remains constant at an average of 37 per hour 
during both visual and instrument conditions, but drops to 32 per hour when 
conditions are below circling minima. Throughput at Christchurch is unaffected by 
weather conditions, averaging the demand rate of 20 per hour in all cases. 
Visual conditions predominate at Auckland and Christchurch airports, accounting for 
approximately 60% of days. Instrument conditions above circling minima account for 
the remainder, excepting 1 % and 3% respectively, which are instrument conditions 
below cirCling minima. At Wellington, a higher incidence of instrument above circling 
minima days occur, comprising some 51 % of the total, with visual conditions 
accounting for 38% of the remainder. The incidence of below circling minima 
conditions is also higher at 11%. This is partially due to the higher minima's at 
Wellington. 
At Auckland or Christchurch, the minimum cloud base under which aircraft are 
permitted to circle visually for a second attempt at landing is between 910 and 670 
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feet. At Wellington, jets may circle if the cloud base is above 1,500' and other aircraft 
if cloud base is above 1,000'. 
Demand 
The majority of demand for service at New Zealand's airports from commercial air 
transport aircraft is centred on Auckland, Wellington and Christchurch airports. 
These airports account for 63% of all air transport movements in New Zealand and 
are the main international as well as domestic ports. 
Growth of traffic movements throughout New Zealand over the past decade has been 
sUbstantial. In the past three years, IFR traffic has increased by 15%, from 453,542 
movements in 1995 to 521,759 in 1997. 
Wellington airport has experienced the most significant growth in air traffic numbers. 
IFR traffic numbers increased by nearly 10% in 1996 and by a further 4% in 1997. 
This has been despite a curfew limiting hours of operation to 0600 - 2300 introduced 
late in 1995. 
Growth at Auckland and Christchurch has been smaller, approximately 3% annually. 
A major reason for the high level of growth at Wellington has been a shift toward 
utilising smaller aircraft types on a more frequent basis than previously. Although 
passenger numbers have increased, this growth has been far exceeded by the rate 
at which aircraft movements have increased. This is testimony to a clear trend 
toward greater frequency of flights by smaller aircraft, catering to consumer demand 
for convenience. 
The pattern or distribution of demand at Auckland and Christchurch airports is 
relatively constant throughout the day. Scheduled demand is not completely smooth 
- both airports experience periods where several aircraft movements are scheduled 
for the same time. The delays, which result from this, are referred to as scheduled 
delay. Wellington also experiences problems with scheduled delay and this problem 
is exacerbated by a schedule pattern that contains large peaks in demand. Morning 
and evening peak demand periods exist during which any delay created is unlikely to 
be dispersed. 
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Capacity 
Capacity at Auckland and Wellington airports has been calculated using capacity 
models developed by this author for the Airways Corporation of New Zealand Ltd. 
Both theoretical maximum capacity and realistic 'declared' capacity is shown, for 
varying weather states. 
Maximum Runway Capacity 
Arrivals Departures 1 Arr. 11 Dep. 
Auckland 
Visual Conditions 34 36 40 
Instrument Conditions 28 36 37 
Wellington 
Visual Conditions 31 35 43 
Instrument Conditions 28 31 38 
Below Circling Minima 21 30 33 
Realistic Runway Capacity 
Visual Instrument Instrument 
Below Circling 
Auckland 
Runway 05 38 36 NA 
Runway 23 37 35 NA 
Wellington 
38 36 28 
95 
Maximum capacity is higher at Wellington then Auckland airport, but this is also 
extremely variable with weather conditions. Capacity during below circling minima 
conditions is approximately 75% of 'normal' levels. The reason for this is the 
requirement at Wellington to 'protect' the missed approach; due mainly to 
surrounding terrain which prevents aircraft from being turned at low levels under 
radar direction. Because of the wide variance of performance capability amongst the 
aircraft using Wellington airport, very large separations must be used in these 
conditions. The result is a sharp decrease in capacity. 
It must be noted that 'below circling conditions' at Auckland and Christchurch airports 
will not reduce capacity unless runway closure occurs (as it may if conditions include 
fog). This is because aircraft may be turned at low altitudes under radar control. 
Because of the high terrain which surrounds Wellington, aircraft cannot be turned 
from the departure track under radar until a far higher altitude has been attained -
hence the need for larger separations between them during these conditions, and the 
resulting decrease in capacity. 
A 'single runway' capacity has been calculated for Christchurch airport, using the 
same methodology as the Auckland and Wellington models. This is not a true 
statement of the actual capacity of Christchurch, which is a multi-runway system, but 
it provides a useful comparison for Auckland and Wellington (note that a multi-
runway system will have a higher, not lower, actual capacity than a single runway 
system). This single runway capacity calculation yields the following result: 
Christchurch Airport Single Runway Capacity 
Visual Conditions 
Instrument Conditions 
Arrivals 
36 
31 
Departures 
44 
44 
1 Arr./1 Dep. 
43 
42 
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Causes of Delay 
The single runway capacity of Christchurch is higher than either Auckland or 
Wellington. Comparison with Auckland and Wellington has been used to identify the 
extent to which differing factors are causes of delay at these airports. Greater 
uniformity of traffic mix is an obvious cause, and inputting the Christchurch traffic mix 
to the Auckland and Wellington capacity models tests the effect of this. 
Auckland / Wellington Capacity - Christchurch Aircraft Type Mix 
Instrument Conditions 
Auckland 
Wellington 
Arrivals 
31 (+3) 
31 (+3) 
Departures 
44 (+8) 
42 (+11) 
1 Arr. 11 Dep. 
39 (+2) 
40 (+2) 
The result is improved capacity at both airports. This is particularly significant for 
Wellington. The requirement to 'protect' the missed approach arises from 
performance differentials amongst the aircraft type mix. As well as increasing overall 
capacity, the consistency of performance of the Christchurch traffic mix greatly 
removes the requirement for large separations in order to protect the missed 
approach. In other words, if this type mix existed at Wellington, capacity on below 
circling minima days would be close to the level of above circling minima days. 
Capacity at both airports is improved, but not to a level which matches Christchurch. 
Thus, aircraft type mix contributes to, but is not the sole cause of lower capacity at 
Auckland and Wellington. The only other differentiating factor between these airports 
is air traffic control procedures. This is identified as the remaining cause of 'less than 
optimal' capacity at Auckland and Wellington. 
In the case of Wellington, air traffic control procedures are very similar to 
Christchurch, except where dictated by terrain avoidance constraints. At Auckland, 
conversely, it is found that the system of tower initiated departures (TIDs) utilises 
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larger separations than the fully co-ordinated system employed by Christchurch and 
Wellington. Capacity at Auckland could be enhanced by approximately 2 movements 
per hour (instrument conditions) by the use of more effective air traffic control 
proced ures. 
Aircraft type mix and air traffic control procedures (Auckland) have been identified as 
factors which contribute to delays by disallowing optimum runway capacity. Another 
factor which similarly affects runway capacity is the movement type mix. Runway 
capacity is lowest when an arrivals only sequence of movements occurs, and is 
optimised by a 1 arrival I 1 departure flow. 
Normal scheduling at all of these airports is characterised by 'bunches' of arrivals 
followed by 'bunches' of departures. While it is recognised that consumer demand 
patterns and airline convenience may not support alterations to this scheduling 
pattern, it must also be recognised that a greater number of aircraft movements could 
be accommodated if the 1 arrival I 1 departure sequencing was observed. Runway 
capacity, in other words, would be higher. 
Congestion is the result of too many aircraft trying to use airport resources - the 
runway - than may be accommodated. This has been identified in two forms: 
The first is scheduled delay, where multiple aircraft movements are scheduled for the 
same time. In this case there is no other outcome but delay. These delays are 
usually of short duration, however, because airport capacity is not exceeded for any 
great length of time. Scheduled delay occurs frequently at all three airports 
examined. 
The second form of delay due to excess demand is true congestion. This occurs 
when available capacity is exceeded over an extended period. Congestion may 
include scheduled delay, but is ultimately due to excess demand. Delays in this case 
may be substantial and are unlikely to be dispersed quickly - until some low demand 
period of sufficient duration occurs. 
Airport capacity is not exceeded at Auckland or Christchurch airports, nor at 
Wellington during visual or instrument conditions which are above circling minima. 
Scheduled delay, therefore, is the cause of the low level of delay experienced on a 
daily basis at these airports. Although not exceeded, it is worth noting that capacity 
is reached during some periods at Auckland and Wellington during instrument 
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conditions. It is for this reason that any scheduled delay has a greater effect, in both 
duration and number of aircraft affected under instrument conditions. 
True congestion exists only at Wellington airport during instrument conditions below 
circling minima. During peak demand periods, capacity may be exceeded by as 
much as 8 - 10 aircraft per hour. When combined with schedule effects, delays can 
become severe. Average delay during these conditions exceeds 11 minutes, and 
peak delays may exceed 1 hour. Congestion cannot be dispersed until a period of 
low demand occurs of sufficient length to accommodate these excess aircraft. 
Congestion at Wellington usually occurs for the duration of the busy periods 0730 -
1030 and 1630 - 2000. 
Congestion in the Future 
Airport congestion is already evident at Wellington airport during conditions below 
circling minima. Delays during other periods, and at other airports is due to schedule 
delay rather than congestion. But this will not remain the case. Air traffic has grown 
consistently over the past decade, and is forecast to continue to grow for at least the 
next fifteen years. The Asia/Pacific Region Forecast report issued by the Air 
Transport Action Group (ATAG) forecasts this growth at an average annual rate of 
5.40/0 to 2010. The effect of this level of increased demand is substantial. Indeed, 
Christchurch is the only airport of the three which has the capability to absorb this 
level of growth without severe congestion resulting. 
Figure 12.1: Christchurch Scheduled Traffic 1997 • 2005 
Forecast Growth @ 5.4% per annum 
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Demand at Auckland airport presently exceeds capacity only for a single short period 
(1830-1900), where delay due to this excess demand is low - approximately four 
minutes. If demand for service increases at the rate forecast by ATAG, Auckland 
airport will experience a level of congestion which exceeds that presently 
experienced at Wellington during below circling conditions by 2005. Congested 
periods of approximately two hours duration will occur in the morning, early afternoon 
and evening, with delay levels up to 30 minutes duration. 
Figure 12.2: Auck land Excess Demand Delay 2005 
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At Wellington airport, the situation is far more serious. While severe congestion is 
presently evident only during conditions below circling minima, a growth rate of 5.4% 
will quickly consume available capacity during instrument above circling minima, and 
even visual conditions. By 2000, congestion will be apparent during the morning 
period 0730-0930 under all conditions, with delays as high as 20 minutes. During 
below circling conditions, congestion will be complete. Delays appear at 0730 and 
will not be cleared until 2100, peaking around 80 minutes at 1830. This is clearly a 
situation which is intolerable, and must be avoided. 
100 
60 
50 
f! 40 
GI 
~ :I 30 
~ 
e 20 < 
10 
90 
80 
>- 70 .. 
! 
~ 60 
ii 50 ~ 
! 40 ~ 
CJ 
I 30 20 
~ 
10 
0 
Figure 12.3: Wellington Scheduled Traffic 1997 - 2005 
Forecast @ 5.4% per annum 
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Figure 12.4: Wellington Excess Demand Delay 2000 
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By 2005, congestion is continuous during instrument conditions above circling 
minima, with peak delays of 90 minutes. Delays begin at 0730 and cannot be 
eliminated until 2100. During visual conditions, peak delay is 75 minutes, and 
congested periods are 0730-1330 and 1600-2030. Both of these scenarios depict 
situations which are far worse than presently experienced during conditions below 
circling minima. By 2005, delays during below circling conditions begin at 0730, peak 
at 350 minutes, with over 200 minutes delay remaining at the 2300 curfew. 
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Figure 12.5: Wellington Excess Demand Delay 2005 
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Clearly this is a situation which cannot exist - the economic implications of aircraft 
incurring this level of delay would render operation into Wellington airport prohibitive. 
This is, however, the strongest possible reason for a solution to the congestion 
problem presently experienced to be sought and implemented. This scenario is an 
explicit statement of the level of congestion which will exist if changes to operations 
at Wellington airport are not devised. 
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Any solution to the problem of congestion at New Zealand airports must take into 
account the causes of this problem. This research has identified several factors that 
disallow capacity maximisation, and others which give rise to congestion and delays. 
Auckland Airport 
Auckland airport has been shown to restrict maximum capacity through the air traffic 
control procedures it applies, and through a less than optimum aircraft type mix. 
Movement type mix (arrival/departure sequencing) is another factor which, if 
managed more effectively, could enhance existing airport capacity. While it is certain 
that significant gains could be made if these factors were addressed, it is unlikely that 
this alone will avert the threat of congestion at Auckland airport indefinitely. 
Capacity enhancement to the level of 42 - 43 movements per hour could be 
expected to result if all of these factors were addressed and optimised. This would 
still result in some level of delay by 2005, but congested periods would be short. 
Delay levels beyond this date could become significant. Management of scheduled 
demand - that is to say, a more even distribution of aircraft movements throughout 
the course of the day - is one option which could enable Auckland airport to accept 
continued growth of air traffic movements, without significant levels of delay, for at 
least the next fifteen years. 
The Auckland Airport Company has already taken a pro-active approach to this 
problem. Attempts are already underway to gain planning permission for a second 
runway. Parallel operations at Auckland would enhance total runway capacity to a 
level in the region of 70 movements per hour. Note that this is not double the single 
runway figure of 42 movements per hour. This is because parallel runway operations 
are usually engineered so that one runway handles arrivals, the other departures. 
Often this is dictated by the structure of arrival and departure routes to and from the 
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airport, as well as simplicity of operation. Operating two mixed-mode (arrivals and 
departures) runways in close proximity requires complex air traffic control procedures 
which must detract from efficiency . 
. Nevertheless, the addition of a second runway to the Auckland system will certainly 
produce sufficient capacity to handle forecast traffic growth well beyond 2010. It 
must also be considered that the proposals for a second runway at Auckland have 
not been prompted by concerns for capacity I congestion alone. Indeed, the major 
driving force behind this is the ability of the existing runway to continue to accept 
traffic. 
Auckland's existing runway undergoes frequent maintenance at each end to repair 
surface damage due to wear and age. Under these conditions the runway remains 
operational with restricted runway length available. In the next few years, however, it 
will be necessary for maintenance work to be carried out on the centre portion of the 
runway. Under these circumstances, it will be impossible for the runway to accept 
any traffic at all. Given the extent of the expected repairs, this will result in Auckland 
airport remaining closed for a period of weeks. As New Zealand's major international 
airport, the loss of revenue and the level of inconvenience this would cause would be 
disastrous. 
It is possible to accommodate forecast growth at Auckland for the next fifteen years 
by capacity optimisation and schedule management techniques alone. It seems very 
likely, however, that a solution well in excess of this will be implemented. The 
addition of a second runway to the Auckland system will effectively postpone the 
requirement for this optimisation by fifteen to twenty years. 
Christchurch Airport 
Christchurch is an airport that has several options available to accommodate a 
sustained rate of traffic growth. The present airport maximises its available capacity 
well, and it is unlikely that forecast growth of demand will approach available capacity 
levels until at least 2010. 
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Christchurch also has available options for increasing airport capacity. These include 
extending the present East-West runway, and even the addition of a second North-
South runway. Indeed, the geographical location of Christchurch and the air routes 
to other locations, and the abundance of flat surrounding terrain would render likely 
the possibility a second North-South runway being utilised as a mixed-mode runway. 
In other words, should Christchurch ever face the requirement to build a second 
runway to accommodate traffic demand, the resulting airport capacity could be in the 
region of 80 - 90 aircraft movements per hour. It is likely to be many years before 
this level of capacity is required by Christchurch airport. 
Wellington Airport 
Wellington airport is not endowed with such a multitude of realistic options, however. 
It is also the airport which has the greatest existing and potential delay problem. As 
such, the need to find appropriate and effective solutions to congestion at Wellington 
is paramount. Options available to solve this problem include: 
1. Additional runway development 
2. Extension to existing runway 
3. Relocation of airport to Paraparaumu or Masterton 
4. Management of existing runway to maximise capacity 
A Second Runway 
Enhancing capacity through additional runway development is a far more complex 
issue for Wellington than for Auckland or Christchurch. The present airport at 
Wellington is built on land reclaimed from the sea. It exists on a narrow peninsula of 
land which is surrounded on either side by higher terrain. In order to construct a 
second runway, this terrain would need to be flattened. There is some doubt as to the 
feasibility of this, and certainly enormous cost would be involved. 
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It is also doubtful that a second runway would constantly solve the capacity problem. 
The minimum allowable distance between runways on which simultaneous aircraft 
1l10vements can take place is 760 metres. While this distance might be achieved, 
during conditions below circling minima the lateral distance between aircraft 
operating from these runways would not be sufficient to provide protection for the 
missed approach. In other words, an aircraft operating from one runway would still 
require additional separation from another aircraft, even if that aircraft were utilising 
the second runway. The result of this is that capacity during below circling minima 
would still be reduced to its present level, despite the fact of two runways in 
operation. 
On visual or instrument above circling minima days, a second runway at Wellington 
could raise capacity to approximately 80 movements per hour. This is a level which 
would be sufficient for many years. It does not address the poor weather congestion 
problem, however. Capacity during below circling minima conditions would be 
enhanced little by a second runway. 
Extending the Existing Runway 
The feasibility of extending the existing runway at Wellington is also under some 
doubt. The expense of such a project would be substantial, as additional land would 
need to be reclaimed for the purpose. 
Extending Wellington's existing runway would be beneficial in terms of the size of 
aircraft which could use the runway, and in reducing the effect of large aircraft on 
capacity. 
At present, the largest aircraft that utilise Wellington are Boeing 767s. These aircraft 
are operated by both Qantas and Air New Zealand, and provide an international 
service between Wellington and several destinations in Australia. These are the only 
international destinations available direct from Wellington. In order to fly further 
afield, larger aircraft with greater range are required. Although larger aircraft (such 
as the Boeing 747SP) can operate into Wellington, they can only do so at light 
weights. The runway at Wellington is too short to permit operations by heavily laden 
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aircraft of this size. This precludes any direct international service to destinations 
further afield than Australia. 
Extending the runway, then, would allow additional flight services to be offered to 
international destinations. The effect, though, of extra heavy aircraft in the traffic mix 
would be detrimental to airport capacity. This is because of the larger wake 
turbulence separation that must be applied to all aircraft following behind a heavy 
category aeroplane. 
At present, when a heavy aircraft flies an instrument approach, a 12 NM separation 
must be allowed behind it because of the distortion caused to the localiser signal of 
the ILS approach. This distortion is caused when an aircraft exits the runway via the 
last taxiway (which heavy aeroplanes almost always do) and is a factor of the siting 
of the localiser at Wellington. If the runway were extended, it is possible that a new 
position could be found for the localizer, thus eliminating the distortion problem. 
In this case, the detrimental effect of heavy aircraft in the traffic mix could be 
reduced. If a runway extension induced no extra international flights by heavy 
aircraft, then it would have the effect of increasing capacity by a small margin through 
removal of the localizer distortion problem. 
This is a vain hope however. Wellington has a population base of over 350,000 
people, and as New Zealand's capital city, commands a high degree of business 
travel. The demand for international services is sUbstantial. If it becomes possible 
(through runway extension) for airlines to offer more extensive international services, 
then it is almost certain that those services will eventuate. 
It is worth noting that Air New Zealand has recently purchased three new Boeing 
737 -300 aircraft. These aeroplanes are a larger and faster variant of the Boeing 737 
presently used on domestic services. Air New Zealand (as at 29 March 1998) 
intends to offer 26 new services between Australia and New Zealand (Auckland, 
Wellington and Christchurch) utilising these new aircraft. This is good news for 
Wellington airport - the Boeing 737 aircraft should be able to land at Wellington 
without requiring the use of the last taxiway to exit the runway, thus avoiding the 
localizer distortion problem. 
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These aircraft are not, however, capable of flying large distances. They can be 
utilised for Trans-Tasman crossings, but do not have the range to carry passengers 
much further afield. If runway extensions allow larger aircraft to operate at 
Wellington, then it is these which will be employed on any international services 
further afield. 
Extending the runway at Wellington, therefore has the potential to reduce the effect 
of heavy aircraft in, the traffic mix, but is almost certain to increase the number of 
heavy aircraft. The final effect on capacity will be detrimental. 
Relocation 
This is an option for Wellington travellers which was initially floated in the late 
nineteen-sixties. At that point in time, it was intended for operations at Wellington 
airfield to be relocated to Paraparaumu, some distance north of Wellington on the 
Kapiti coast. This scheme was rescinded, however, and Wellington airport was 
developed in its present form to handle all domestic and international aircraft traffic to 
the area. 
This may be considered an unfortunate, even ill conceived decision. Many of the 
problems associated with Wellington (particularly the missed approach requirement) 
arise from the terrain that surrounds the airfield. Restricted runway length is another 
issue, also arising from the airport's location on reclaimed land. Neither of these 
difficulties would have applied to Paraparaumu. 
This is no longer the case, however. The township of Paraparaumu has been 
allowed to extend so that housing now exists in close proximity to the airport. This 
housing would probably need to be acquired and demolished if Paraparaumu were to 
be developed into an international airport. There are three main reasons for this: 
1. Runway length at Paraparaumu would need to be increased for full international 
services to operate. 
2. Noise pollution and abatement considerations would require greater distance 
between housing and runway. Departure and arrival tracks should also be 
considered. 
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3. Additional land would be required for development of terminal, hangar, parking 
and engineering facilities. 
It should also be noted that Paraparaumu is no longer publicly owned, having been 
sold to a private buyer in 1995. This does not necessarily preclude development, 
and could conceivably be a positive circumstance. 
Paraparaumu is not the only location which could be considered as an alternative to 
the existing Wellington airport. Masterton could equally be considered. A similar 
distance from Wellington, Masterton does not suffer form the difficulty of close 
proximity housing and ample undeveloped land surrounds the airport, thus providing 
the possibility of expansion. Flat surrounding terrain ensures that none of the 
difficulties presently experienced at the existing Wellington airport would be evident 
at Masterton. 
The cost of such a venture, at either location would be extremely high. The existing 
runways at these airports are neither long enough nor strong enough to cater for 
heavy jet traffic. As well as new runways, terminal and other airport facilities would 
need to be constructed. An indication of this cost may be given by the new terminal 
facilities presently being built at Wellington - a total of $60 million is given by the 
Wellington Airport Company as the cost of this construction. 
As well as the requirement for more land, facilities and housing eradication, a link 
with Wellington City would need to be established. To create a viable alternative to 
the existing airport, travel to and from the Paraparaumu airport would need to be 
quick and convenient. A high speed rail network, or electric train could provide the 
answer, but again the cost associated with this must be high, particularly in the case 
of Masterton which is separated from Wellington by mountain ranges. 
Managing Existing Resources 
This research has identified the main causes of delay at New Zealand airports. 
Amongst these causes are factors which disallow capacity maximisation - aircraft 
type mix, movement type mix, and air traffic control procedures at Auckland - it also 
identifies delay due to excess demand - schedule delay and congestion. 
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One option to solve the problem, then, must be management of airport resources in 
such a way as to reduce or eliminate these causes of delay. 
Aircraft type mix directly affects airport capacity through the wake turbulence 
separation that must be employed between successive aircraft movements. 
Similarity of aircraft type and performance is the only means to ensure minimum 
separation is available. Volume of passenger numbers during peak periods would 
suggest that regulation of aircraft types to medium category aircraft, in the 30 to 120 
seat range is the appropriate standard. 
Standardising the mix of aircraft types using the airport to medium category jets and 
turboprop aeroplanes has several distinct advantages: 
• Capacity enhancement through minimised separations between aircraft 
• Reduction of traffic numbers as larger aircraft may be utilised less frequently to 
carry the passengers presently transported on light commuter aircraft. 
• Standardisation of aircraft performance on approach and departure, thus allowing 
the standardisation of a missed approach profile. This would allow protection of the 
missed approach at Wellington without the need to provide larger separations 
between aircraft. 
Restricting aircraft types using the runway to those which meet a standardised 
performance criteria, while making no difference to capacity during visual conditions, 
could raise capacity during instrument conditions to 40 per hour. More importantly, 
however, standardised performance would eliminate the need to provide larger 
separation in order to protect the missed approach. This does not remove the 
requirement to protect the missed approach, but removes the need for larger 
separations to do so. The result of this is that capacity degradation during instrument 
conditions below circling minima will be reduced or eliminated. Put another way, 
airport capacity during below circling minima conditions would be approximately 38 -
40 movements per hour, rather than the present 32. 
This is a very significant gain. Indeed, this course of action has the ability to 
eliminate the congestion delay presently experienced at Wellington airport. 
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Delay due to congestion occurs at Wellington on every occasion that the weather is 
below circling minima. Small delays may occur at other times, largely due to 
schedule delay. These delays are larger on instrument days than visual, because 
demand is closer to capacity on these occasions. By enhancing capacity on below 
circling days to approximate the level of above circling days, delay may be reduced 
to a similar level. Figure 13.1 below depicts forecast growth at 5.40/0 to 2005, 
overlaid with the enhanced level of capacity which could result from the limiting of 
aircraft types. 
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Figure 13.1: Wellington Forecast Demand and Enhanced 
Capacity 1997·2005 
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Note that capacity is not reduced during below circling conditions - a constant 40 
movements per hour is available throughout all weather conditions. Note also that 
this represents restriction of aircraft types only - the benefits of reduced aircraft 
numbers due to larger types and the smoothing of demand patterns which could be 
achieved by schedule management are not depicted. 
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Figure 13.2: Wellington Excess Demand Delay 1997-2005 -
En han c e d Cap a city 
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In reality, the benefits of this option would be higher than this. If larger aircraft types 
replaced small commuter aircraft, frequency of flight would also be reduced. A single 
Saab 340 or ATR 72 aircraft could replace 3 - 4 E110 Bandierante aircraft. This 
does not necessarily require that flight options for the commuting public be reduced. 
At present, the two main airlines offering regional services within New Zealand" 
Ansett and Air New Zealand operate largely duplicated schedules. Co-operative 
practices such as code sharing would allow the same frequency of flight options with 
fewer, larger aircraft. 
Delays at New Zealand airports are due to true congestion only during below circling 
minima conditions at Wellington airport. At all other times, delay is the result of poor 
or uncoordinated scheduling. There are many periods at all New Zealand airports 
where several aircraft movements are scheduled for the same time - usually followed 
by periods where few movements are planned. The delay that results from this, 
while normally small, could be eliminated if a co-ordinated approach was taken to 
scheduling airport usage. As well as ensuring a smoother flow of existing aircraft 
movements, managing scheduled demand in this manner offers the opportunity to 
avoid creation of congested situations. 
In addition to this, by managing scheduled demand with reference to available 
capacity, sequencing of traffic movements may be addressed. This takes two forms. 
The first is movement type mix, where capacity is maximised by a 1 arrival I 1 
departure flow. At present, scheduling of traffic movements is characterised by 
'bunches' of arrivals followed by 'bunches' of departures. Minimisation of this 
distribution could allow capacity enhancement of approximately 4 movements per 
hour in most situations. 
The second benefit of managing scheduled demand is a greater ability to sequence 
aircraft in the most expeditious manner. For example, the time that must be left 
between a Boeing 737 and a following ATR 72 aircraft is less than between a Boeing 
737 and a SW3 Metroliner. It is therefore more efficient to insert the ATR 72 between 
the Boeing and the Metroliner, as the three movements could then be completed in a 
lesser time than would otherwise be the case. This function is already performed to 
some extent by air traffic controllers, but could be achieved to a greater extent 
through schedule planning. 
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If airport resources were managed by these means, the outcome would be beneficial 
in several forms. First and foremost is the reduction, or possible elimination of the 
congested condition of Wellington airport during weather conditions below circling 
minima. Second, the delay experienced at Wellington during other weather 
conditions, and at other airports could be reduced or eliminated through management 
of traffic schedules. Third, enhancement of the existing capacity levels of these 
airports will be achieved through greater standardisation of aircraft types. Finally, this 
option offers greater opportunity for capacity maximisation through improved 
movement type mix. 
The cost of this option must be contemplated in two forms. Primarily, the cost 
associated with upgrading of aircraft types, and subsequent operation of these 
aircraft must be considered. Initial purchase, maintenance, operating equipment, fuel 
and crew costs are the relevant components of this cost. This will be offset to some 
extent by the higher seating of these aircraft and the potential revenue this may 
generate. The cost will nevertheless be substantial, but cannot be considered in the 
same category as the cost associated with airport relocation or the construction of 
additional runways. 
Conclusion 
This research has shown that the majority of delays at New Zealand airports are due 
to poor scheduling of aircraft movements, rather than to true congestion. The 
exception to this is delays incurred during conditions of poor weather at Wellington 
airport, where capacity is greatly exceeded for substantial periods of time. 
An appropriate solution, therefore, should beone which takes account of the causes 
of delay and the level of intervention necessary to effect a solution. The relative cost 
of delays must also be considered, as must the probable future extent of the 
problem. A further consideration is the time required to effect any solution. 
Auckland and Christchurch airports each have a substantial level of available 
capacity. It is unlikely that delays due to congestion will affect Christchurch airport in 
the foreseeable future, unless the airport becomes subject to the type mix changes 
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and greater frequency of flight which characterises operations at Auckland and 
Wellington. Indeed, Christchurch would be more accurately consideredas a model 
solution to the problem of congestion than as a potential source of that problem. The 
option of expansion must also be considered as most possible for this airport, given 
the lack of terrain and space restrictions. 
Auckland airport does not currently experience congestion. Delays at this airport are 
due almost exclusively to schedule delay - a problem which is most efficiently dealt 
with by resource management means than by wholesale expansion of capacity. 
Forecasted future levels of demand, however, indicate that capacity may well 
become a problem for Auckland within the next five to seven years. By 2005, 
congestion could reach the level presently experienced by Wellington airport on 
below circling days. Management of scheduled demand and air traffic control 
procedures, however, offers an adequate solution to the level of excess demand 
indicated by this forecast. 
This research has shown that the capacity of Auckland airport could be enhanced 
significantly by the application of the co-ordinated system of air traffic control which is 
utilised at Wellington and Christchurch airports, and by improvements in the mix of 
aircraft types using the airport. As well as raising capacity, improving type mix also 
offers the benefit of reducing current levels of demand in terms of aircraft numbers. 
This benefit would extend to future operations. Managing schedule distribution and 
movement types provides the means for available capacity to be maximised. 
By these means, it is possible to raise the available capacity of Auckland airport by 
approximately four aircraft movements per hour. While this is not sufficient to 
support continued growth of traffic numbers beyond 2005 without congestion 
occurring, this solution offers an immediate solution to the present problem of 
schedule delay and forecast congestion. This is probably the most significant aspect 
of this solution. 
Wellington airport currently experiences a serious congestion problem during 
weather conditions which are below circling minima. For this reason, it is essential 
that an appropriate solution to this problem be identified and initiated immediately. 
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Cost issues cannot be ignored in any evaluation of a solution to congestion at 
Wellington (or any other) airport. The cost of relocation, or of extensions to the 
existing runway at Wellington must be considered in the tens or hundreds of millions 
of dollars. When balanced against a total industry cost of some 15,000,000 Kg of 
fuel annually, it is difficult to justify this expense. Further, the majority of this cost of 
delay stems from the schedule delay that occurs on a daily basis at all three airports. 
This does not, of course, take account of the ongoing cost of delays in terms of crew, 
maintenance, and inconvenience. But these factors become important only when 
delays are extreme. The additional industry cost of any of these factors is unlikely to 
be significant when delays experienced are in the three to five minute range. True 
congestion, however, such as that experienced at Wellington airport raises both 
average and maximum delay. The ability of airlines and air traffic control to dissipate 
that delay is also reduced, thereby ensuring that ongoing effects of delay are more 
widespread. The size of the congestion problem at Wellington airport, combined with 
future forecasted levels of delay demand that an immediate solution be found to this 
problem. 
Any attempt to either construct a second runway or to extend the existing runway at 
Wellington (cost and feasibility issues aside) is insufficient to solve the problem on 
the basis of time required alone. Both options will require reclaiming of land followed 
by runway construction. The time required to achieve this may be measured in 
years, rather than weeks or months. Further, this does not address the issue of 
capacity decline during conditions below circling minima. In other words, while 
additional runways or increasing existing runway length may allow some increase in 
normal available runway capacity, it will not provide a solution to the problem across 
all conditions. Given that congestion at Wellington occurs predominantly during 
below circling minima conditions, this option is, in fact, no solution at all. 
For these reasons, the option of managing existing resources to maximise airport 
capacity is identified as the best option to solve this problem. This is the only 
available option which offers an immediate and feasible solution to the congestion 
problem, and at minimal industry cost. It should also be stressed that this option in 
no way precludes or prevents the simultaneous or future implementation of any other 
option. Rather, it is a solution which may be implemented equally effectively on its 
own or in conjunction with other options. 
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The principle requirements of this option are: 
1. Restriction of aircraft types using the airport during peak demand periods to those 
which can meet standardised performance criteria - E.g. 170 Knots on final 
approach to a distance of 4 NM, and speed/climb performance criteria. 
2. Management of demand schedules in accordance with available capacity. 
3. Management of demand schedules to maximise capacity - via movement types 
and arrival/departure orders. 
The principle benefits of this option are: 
1. A large reduction in, or possible elimination of the capacity degradation that 
presently occurs during below circling minima conditions. In other words, airport 
capacity will remain nearly constant throughout all weather conditions (fog / 
runway closure excepted). 
2. A small increase in total airport capacity. 
3. A reduction of the total number of aircraft movements presently occurring through 
utilization of larger aircraft - thus providing spare capacity for some future growth. 
4. A low cost and immediate solution. 
116 
ACNZ Airways Corporation of New Zealand Limited. 
Aerodrome A defined area of land intended to be used wholly or in part for the 
arrival, departure and surface movement of aircraft. 
Aerodrome Meteorological Minima The limiting meteorological conditions 
AFTN 
specified for the purpose of determining the usability of the aerodrome 
either for taking off or for landing. 
Aeronautical fixed telecommunication network - a world wide system 
of fixed circuits provided, as part of the aeronautical service, for the 
exchange of messages and/or digital data between aeronautical fixed 
stations. 
Ardmore Training Area Airspace surrounding Ardmore aerodrome which may 
ATDb 
ATAG 
BADA 
restrict departure traffic from Auckland airport. 
Aviation Traffic Database - a database of air traffic movements within 
New Zealand, including take-off and arrival times of flights, held by 
ACNZ. 
Air Transport Action Group. 
Base of Aircraft Data - aircraft performance summary data reported by 
Eurocontrol. 
CAA Civil Aviation Authority (N.Z.) 
DFS Deutsche Flugsicherung GmbH. (Federal Republic of Germany) 
DME Distance Measuring Equipment. 
Eurocontrol European air traffic service provider 
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FAA Federal Aviation Administration (U.S.) 
lATA International Air transport Association 
IFR A flight conducted in accordance with instrument flight rules. 
ILS Instrument Landing System - navigational system encompassing 
Height (glideslope) and range (Iocaliser) information. Usually used in 
conjunction with DME. 
IMC Instrument Meteorological Conditions: Meteorological conditions 
expressed in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling, less 
than The specified minima for visual conditions. 
Knot Nautical miles per hour 
Missed Approach The procedure to be followed if the approach cannot be 
continued and a landing made 
Mixed mode Use of a runway for both arrival and departure movements 
Movement Take off or landing. 
NATS National Air traffic Service (U.K.) 
NDB Non-directional radio beacon - a navigational aid for aircraft. 
NM Nautical Mile 
PACE Program for Airport Capacity Efficiency 
Parallel Operations Simultaneous use of two parallel runways, usually one runway 
designated for arrivals, the other for departures 
Radar Separation The separation used when aircraft position information is 
derived from radar sources. 
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Radar Vectoring The provision of navigational guidance to aircraft in the form of 
Rwy34 
specific headings, based on the use of radar. 
Runway 34 - refers to runway vector - in this case, a runway oriented 
340 degrees (magnetic). Opposite vector is 16 (160 degrees). 
Similarly, Runway 23 (230 degrees), with opposite vector 05 (050 
degrees). 
Separation Spacing of aircraft to ensure their safe movement in flight and while 
taking off and landing. 
Single Mode Operations Use of a runway for specific purpose of take-offs OR 
landings 
TIDs Tower Initiated Departures 
Titahi Bay 13 NM north of Wellington, beginning of instrument final approach to 
Runway 16. 
Tory VOR VOR located at 'Tory', S41 11 09, E174 21 45. Used as a waypoint 
and enroute hold for aircraft arriving at Wellington. 
Vector 
VFR 
VMC 
VOR 
WIAL 
Runway orientation (direction of use). 
A flight conducted in accordance with visual flight rules. 
Visual Meteorological Conditions: Meteorological conditions expressed 
in terms of visibility, distance from cloud, and ceiling, equal to or better 
than specified minima. 
VHF Omni-directional radio range - a navigational aid for aircraft. 
Wellington International Airport Company 
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AERODROMES / AIRPORTS 
NZAA Abbreviation for Auckland aerodrome. 5370029 E174 4730 
NZAP Taupo aerodrome 5384423 E176 05 04 
NZAR Ardmore aerodrome 5370147 E174 58 24 
NZCH Christchurch aerodrome 5432915 E172 32 02 
NZDN Dunedin aerodrome 5455541 E170 1154 
NZGS Gisborne aerodrome 5383948 E1775842 
NZHN Hamilton aerodrome 53751 59 E1752007 
NZMF Milford aerodrome 5444024 E167 5524 
NZNP New Plymouth aerodrome 5390031 E1741045 
NZNR Napier aerodrome S39 2757 E1765212 
NZNS Nelson aerodrome 5411754 E1731316 
NZNV Invercargill aerodrome 5462454 E168 19 12 
NZPM Palmerston North aerodrome 5401914 E175 3701 
NZPP Paraparaumu aerodrome 5405417 E174 59 21 
NZQN Queenstown aerodrome 5450116 E168 44 21 
NZRO Rotorua aerodrome 5380633 E176 1902 
NZTG Tauranga aerodrome 5374019 E1761146 
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NZWB 
NZWN 
B767 
B747 
B737 
BA46 
DH8 
SF34 
SW3/4 
E110 
PA31 
C421 
C208 
HEAVY 
MEDIUM 
Woodbourne aerodrome S41 31 06 1:1735213 
Wellington aerodrome S41 1938 1:1744819 
AIRCRAFT 
Boeing 767 aircraft (Twin engine Jet, approx. 220 seats) 
Boeing 747 aircraft (4 engine Jet, approx. 420 seats) 
Boeing 737 aircraft (Twin-engine Jet, approx.130 seats) 
British Aerospace 146 aircraft (4 engine Jet, approx. 81 seats) 
De Havilland DHC-8 Dash 8 (Twin engine Turbo-prop, 43 seats) 
Saab 340 (Twin engine Turbo-prop, 44 seats) 
Fairchild Metroliner III (Twin engine Turbo-prop, 21 seats) 
Embraer Bandierante (Twin engine Turbo-prop, 14 seats) 
Piper Chieftain / Navajo aircraft (light twin, approx. 1 0 seats) 
Cessna 421 aircraft (light twin, approx. 10 seats) 
Cessna 208 aircraft (single engine, 8 seats) 
Heavy category aircraft (above 136,000 Kg maximum weight) 
Medium category aircraft (above 7,000 Kg, but less than 136,000 Kg 
maximum weight) 
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LIGHT Light category aircraft (below 7,000 Kg maximum weight) 
LTWIN Light category twin engine aircraft (EG. PA31, C421) 
Single Light category, single engine aircraft (EG. C208, PA28) 
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